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CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING: A LEGAL 
PRIMER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONERS IN 
CALIFORNIA 
 
W. David Ball* & Robert Weisberg* 
 
     ABSTRACT 
 
California criminal justice agencies need access to data in order to 
provide security, health care treatment, and appropriate programming, as 
well as to coordinate these activities with other agencies.  By the same 
token, outside agencies—whether criminal, social service, or non-
governmental—could often do their jobs more effectively with access to 
information generated or retained within particular criminal justice 
agencies.  Criminal justice realignment under AB 109 has only heightened 
the need for inter-agency data sharing and cooperation, yet there continue 
to be misunderstandings about the legal framework surrounding 
information exchange. 
 
This Article aims to provide a basic, practical background on the legal 
rules relevant to information exchange, highlighting under what 
circumstances—and with whom—criminal justice agencies may share, must 
share, or must not share their information.  The Article’s basic conclusion 
is that criminal justice data sharing is enabled by the existing legal regime.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
California criminal justice agencies need access to data in order to 
provide security, health care treatment, and appropriate programming, as 
well as to coordinate these activities with other agencies.  By the same 
token, outside agencies—whether criminal, social service, or non-
governmental—could often do their jobs more effectively with access to 
information generated or retained within particular criminal justice 
agencies.   For example, knowing that an arrestee is mentally ill could assist 
a jail with his classification, housing, and medical care; similarly, knowing 
the risk status of a released prisoner could help local community 
supervision prepare for support services and supervision.  Coordination of 
information exchange involves a number of technical and organizational 
challenges, but there is also considerable uncertainty about governing law.  
So, while the need for information is great, in the absence of legal guidance, 
some agencies are understandably reluctant to share information.  They are 
unsure about whether it will expose them to civil liability under statutes 
protecting confidentiality or other legal rules.  In regard to the many varied 
categories of individual information they handle, agency officials often ask: 
When am I forbidden to disclose information? When am I allowed to 
disclose information (and to whom)?  When am I required to disclose 
information (and to whom)? 
 
This Article is designed to address and alleviate these concerns, to 
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help state and local officials understand the most important and widely 
applicable legal doctrines that determine their responsibilities in handling 
information developed or collected in the many stages of criminal justice.  
Readers should, however, note that this Primer is only a starting point: its 
goal is to provide a broadly accurate overview of the issues, not to give 
legal advice for specific governmental decisions.  Therefore, we urge 
readers to consult with an attorney before adopting any specific new 
policies on information sharing or making specific decisions about 
information-sharing in any sensitive matter. 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
A review of the legal doctrines governing information-sharing in 
criminal justice leads to one overall conclusion:  California law contains a 
strong mandate for robust information-sharing among agencies involved in 
any substantial way with criminal justice, and criminal justice information-
sharing faces few legal barriers—surely far fewer than many officials tend 
to believe as a matter of common intuition or perception.  So long as 
agencies exercise care in the security and confidentiality of the information 
they exchange, they will, in general, not be exposed to statutory or civil 
liability for information transfers that serve reasonable institutional 
purposes.  
 
One should read the entire Primer to get a sense of this legal area as a 
whole, but the Primer has also been divided into topic headings for easy 
reference. The following key summary points reflect the organization of the 
Primer: 
 
 
1. Sharing summary information among criminal justice agencies is a 
“safe harbor.”  Agencies should feel comfortable sharing this 
information with other criminal justice agencies, provided the 
sharing is done with appropriate safeguards.  These safeguards 
already govern the use of criminal justice data.  That is, changes 
wrought by either technology or realignment do not change the 
rules.  As long as agencies continue to follow the rules with which 
they are (or should be) already familiar, there is nothing new—and 
uncertain—about exchanging such information electronically or 
under the rubric of realignment.  Statutes and agency regulations 
govern who can properly use data in the California Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS).  Those statutes 
and regulations extend data privileges to those with a “need to 
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know” and those with a “right to know” in law enforcement.  
Agencies that share data maintained in separate case management 
systems, where those systems may include some CLETS derived 
information, should follow the security requirements (such as secure 
network and limited access) for CLETS secondary dissemination.  
Neither intellectual property nor security concerns should prohibit 
this increased sharing, so long as existing security policies are 
incorporated into any additional sharing procedures.  Moreover, this 
principle applies to sharing with federal law enforcement authorities 
as well as sharing with other state or local authorities. 
 
2. Medical information disclosure laws—the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the California 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA)—do not pose 
great obstacles to information sharing.  HIPAA is very weakly 
enforced and has many relevant exceptions. In practice, the CMIA 
governs and should accommodate information sharing.  The 
California Constitution and Information Practices Act add potential 
complexities, but most of the relevant considerations for an 
information sharing system are in CMIA and HIPAA. 
 
3. Because of prohibitions contained in the California Constitution, 
government agencies need to establish very clear procedures 
controlling disclosure of information from or about crime victims.    
 
4. Government agencies hoping to prevent disclosure of records under 
the California Public Records Act (CPRA) should recognize that, on 
the whole, courts construing the CPRA will tend to favor public 
disclosure. 
5. In regard to criminal investigations, employees of police 
departments and the judicial branch are not likely to suffer any 
consequences for relying on inaccurate data in executing search 
warrants, so long as the errors leading to the unlawful search were 
truly negligent. But where errors leading to unlawful searches are 
widespread and systemic, evidence resulting from the unlawful 
search may be suppressed, and employees or departments may be 
subject to civil liability.  The rare but successful instances of § 1983 
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claims for inaccurate data strongly suggest that agencies implement 
protocols that allow individuals to check and report errors in their 
records, particularly where the records are widely shared and affect 
that individual’s ability to take advantage of public and private 
services. 
 
6. Confidential information in the hands of government officials may 
trigger a defendant’s due process right to discovery of potentially 
exculpatory evidence. District Attorneys, who are legally bound to 
share exculpatory information with defendants, may be responsible 
for disclosing such information that is held by other agencies, if that 
other agency’s system or operation is sufficiently integrated with 
that of the prosecutor’s office. 
 
7. The risks of civil liability for defamation or invasion of privacy from 
the sharing of criminal justice information are very small.  Broad 
protections for governmental officials and agencies acting in good 
faith serve to insulate them against lawsuits for wrongful disclosure, 
at least in the absence of intentional or malicious conduct.   
*** 
 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I gives an overview of the data 
sharing landscape.  This information is included largely for non-
practitioners, as the information it contains is common knowledge to those 
who work within California’s criminal justice system.  Part II discusses the 
“safe harbor” case of criminal justice agencies sharing summary criminal 
justice information among themselves.  The legal rules, in general, promote 
this activity, provided that certain basic safeguards (already in place) are 
followed.  Part III discusses issues related to medical information governed 
by HIPAA (and, to a lesser extent, the California state equivalent), 
concluding that what issues there are would be easily solved.  Part IV 
briefly examines the special case of information about victims, which is 
protected under Marsy’s Law.  Part V discusses when criminal justice 
agencies must disclose information to private parties under the California 
Public Records Act.  Part VI discusses issues relating to investigation and 
litigation, specifically what might happen if law enforcement relies on 
inaccurate data when conducting its investigation, and what duties 
prosecutors have to disclose information to the defense.  It also touches on 
how evidentiary privileges might come into play with greater information 
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exchange.  Finally, Part VII discusses liability, concluding that there is little 
scope for claims of defamation or invasion of privacy. 
 
 I.  THE DATA-SHARING LANDSCAPE  
 
This section provides a rudimentary survey of the California data-
sharing landscape.  Most practitioners, who will already be familiar with the 
main mechanisms of data exchange, can skip this section.   
 
Information exchange in California takes place under a variety of 
forms: CLETS, case management systems such as COPLINK, and Regional 
Information Sharing Systems.  Nearly every official working in California’s 
criminal justice system should be familiar with the operation of the 
California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), the 
backbone of state criminal justice information.1  In addition, most 
practitioners will be familiar with case management systems (CMS’s—also 
known as Records Management Systems, or RMS’s), of which the most 
popular is COPLINK.  These systems collect data electronically and can 
share this information—to varying degrees, with varying ease—with 
outside agencies.  Finally, agencies also regularly share data through joint 
agreements2 or under regional arrangements that disseminate data across 
many different jurisdictions, most notably through Regional Information 
Sharing Systems (RISS).  Each of these three types of data sharing 
arrangements will be discussed in turn. 
 
CLETS.  CLETS is a “high-speed communications application” that 
offers law enforcement agencies access to dozens of unique databases with 
local, state, federal, and international criminal justice information.3  The 
state provides each county with hardware and switching center personnel 
for one CLETS access point.4  Local agencies must then furnish their own 
                                                 
1
 (As a reference guide, a separate Appendix to this Primer summarizes the basic 
CLETS operational scheme and gives details on other databases.)    
2
 See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE INTEGRATED LAW AND 
JUSTICE AGENCY OF ORANGE COUNTY, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
DEPARTMENT AND KNOWLEDGE COMPUTING CORPORATION (on file with author) 
(hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT). 
3
 DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (CLETS) 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN §2.7 (Draft Oct. 
29, 2008) [hereinafter CLETS Strategic Plan]. 
4
 Bill Lockyer, California Attorney General, Testimony to the Little Hoover 
Commission Gov’t Technology Hearing (Feb. 24, 2000), available at 
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/gov’tech/LockyerFeb00.pd [hereinafter Lockyer 
Testimony]. 
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equipment and coordinate with the county in order to connect to this 
interface.5  Some agencies, like police departments, can connect directly to 
CLETS using Computer Aided Dispatch systems to query CLETS from the 
field.6  Most other agencies access CLETS through designated terminals, 
which connect to their county’s access point and then relay information to 
and from the state’s databases. 
 
One of the primary uses of CLETS is reporting summary criminal 
history information, or RAP sheets (Record of Arrest and Prosecution).7  
The California Department of Justice (DOJ) must “maintain state summary 
criminal history information” and “furnish” it to agencies, including among 
others state courts, peace officers, prosecuting city attorneys, state district 
attorneys, public defenders and child welfare agencies “when needed in the 
course of their duties.”8  
 
In order to collect this criminal history information, the California 
Attorney General is required to “procure from any available source, and file 
for record and report in the offices of the bureau, all . . . information . . . of 
all persons convicted of a felony, or imprisoned for violating any of the 
military, naval or criminal laws of the United States.”9 Each sheriff or 
police chief executive must furnish to the California DOJ daily reports with 
information about specific misdemeanors and felonies,10 and also notify the 
California DOJ when an arrested person is transferred to another agency’s 
custody or “released without having a complaint or accusation filed with a 
court.”11 State courts are then obliged to report to the California DOJ when 
they dispose of a case.12  In Penal Code §§ 13100 -13326, the California 
Legislature has set detailed standards for the data elements that arresting 
agencies and courts are required to report to the California DOJ, which the 
California DOJ maintains in criminal justice databases accessible via 
CLETS. 
 
CMS.  In addition to accessing data via CLETS, many cities and 
                                                 
5
 Id.  
6
 Id.  
7
 See People v. Martinez, 22 Cal. 4th 106 (2000) (allowing admissibility of 
RAP sheet as evidence of criminal history and discussing statutory framework 
requiring the CA DOJ to maintain criminal summary information). 
8
 CAL. PENAL CODE §11105 (2009). 
9
 Id. §11101. 
10
 Id. §11107. 
11
 Id. §11115. 
12
 Id. §13151. 
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counties maintain individual databases, often called “case management 
systems,” tailored to their localities’ needs. These systems may operate 
independently or may link with other agencies. San Francisco County, for 
example, has integrated all of its criminal justice agencies into one network, 
called JUSTIS, but does not intend to integrate with any other county.13 
Monterey County, alternatively, attempted to integrate its Criminal Justice 
Information System with four other counties—Kern, San Joaquin, Marin 
and San Mateo—but those counties have “never shared data as originally 
anticipated.”14 Information maintained in local systems is not identical to 
the information furnished to CLETS—the CA DOJ only requires specific 
reporting elements, such as records of arrest and case disposition—but local 
agencies may keep richer records tailored to their local criminal justice 
system, such as detailed investigation files, court dockets and jail records.   
 
Private vendors, such as COPLINK, specialize in technology that 
links these case management systems to allow for real-time “complex data 
searches” across multiple databases in order to “uncover hidden 
relationships” and aid in investigations.15 Agencies might favor systems like 
COPLINK because users can access information via the web from their own 
computer terminals, instead of being limited to designated CLETS access 
points. They can also share the information in their individual case 
management systems, which may contain more detailed records than the 
California DOJ requests. Agencies wishing to share data with one another 
in this way often enter into contracts or joint powers agreements,16 because 
unlike the myriad information sharing statutes that govern the California 
DOJ’s data requirements, no explicit statutory mechanism exists to provide 
for information sharing between organizations. 
 
RISS.  Data sharing also takes place on a national level. The U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance has funded Regional 
Information Sharing Systems (RISS), which operates via secure intranet “to 
                                                 
13
 See Office of Budget Analyst, San Francisco, The Justice Information 
Tracking System (JUSTIS), 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/budanalyst_page.asp?id=68983. 
14
 COUNTY OF MONTEREY, ADDENDUM TO REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL FOR 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SERVICES FOR THE REPLACEMENT AND/OR UPGRADE OF 
THE JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTEREY 2 (July 18, 
2006), available at 
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/iss/pdf/Addendum%20RFP%209901.pdf. 
15
 COPLINK, http://www.coplink.com (last visited October 19, 2009). 
16
 CAL GOV’T CODE §6500 (2009) (Granting authority to enter into Joint 
Powers Agreements). See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 2. 
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facilitate law enforcement communications and information sharing 
nationwide.”17 RISS systems divide the nation into six regional “RISS 
Intelligence Centers.”18 California is a member of the Western States 
Information Network, with other member agencies in Alaska, California, 
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, Canada and Guam.19 
 
The increased sharing of criminal justice information poses 
challenges beyond issues of technological integration. Federal, state and 
local agencies have many security and privacy concerns, raising 
“[q]uestions such as who owns the data, who has access to the data, [and] 
who has the right to use the data.”20   
    
II.  DISCLOSURE OF SUMMARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION 
 
Generally, sharing criminal justice information with other criminal 
justice agencies raises no legal red flags—and, in fact, this sharing is 
required in some circumstances.  There are well-established rules and 
regulations involving the dissemination of CLETS information—so there is 
little that should be novel or uncertain about sharing this information.  The 
discussion that follows will be framed by three separate issues: when 
information must be disclosed, when it may be disclosed, and when it may 
not be disclosed.   The analysis is complicated slightly by the fact that there 
are two types of criminal justice information—summary information and 
non-summary information—and that there are several kinds of agencies to 
whom such information might potentially be disclosed.  An analysis of the 
issues involved in disclosure of information depends first on the kind of 
information, and second on the agency to which the information is 
disclosed.  This section deals with summary information disclosed to 
different types of agencies. 
 
The California Penal Code creates a strong foundation for integrated 
criminal justice information systems and, more generally, formalized 
information sharing among actors in the criminal justice system.21   Penal 
Code Section 13100, in part, recognizes the need for improved access and 
sharing of information across criminal justice agencies.22 Penal Code 
                                                 
17
 Regional Information Sharing Systems, http://www.riss.net/overview.aspx 
(last visited October 19, 2009). 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Lockyer Testimony, supra note 4. 
21
 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(A)-(S) (2008).  
22
 The California Penal Code defines criminal justice agencies as “those 
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Section 13100(a) explains that “the criminal justice agencies in this state 
require, for the performance of their official duties, accurate and reasonably 
complete offender record information.”23  Penal Code 13100(e), in turn, 
states that “the recording, reporting, storage, analysis, and dissemination of 
criminal offender information in this state must be made more uniform and 
efficient, and better controlled and coordinated.”24 
 
Summary criminal justice information is information pertaining to “the 
identification and criminal history of any person, such as name, date of 
birth, physical description, dates of arrest, arresting agencies and booking 
numbers, charges, dispositions, and similar data about a former criminal 
offender.”25  Local law enforcement agencies are allowed to freely 
exchange summary criminal history information (i.e. RAP sheets), provided 
that the information is a product of the agencies’ independent efforts and it 
is not an investigatory record.   
 
Non-summary information includes information such as 
intelligence, analytical, or investigative reports and files, or sensitive 
individual information as it evolves during the stages of prosecution, 
incarceration, probation, and parole.  Non-summary information is defined 
negatively by the statute: “[L]ocal summary criminal history information 
does not refer to records and data compiled by criminal justice agencies 
other than that local agency, nor does it refer to records of complaints to or 
investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or 
security procedures of, the local agency.”26 
 
Victims’ information is also not included in summary information.  
The California Constitution contains a Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBR), 
which sets strict prohibitions on the type of information state and county 
agencies can release about a victim or a victim’s family. California voters 
updated the VBR in 2008 through Proposition 9, introducing several layers 
of complexity to issues surrounding the release of victim information and 
the victim’s right to refuse discovery requests by the defense. Due to the 
                                                                                                                            
agencies at all levels of government which perform as their principle functions, 
activities which either: (a) relate to the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, 
incarceration, or correction of criminal offenders; or (b) relate to the collection, 
storage, dissemination or usage of criminal offender record information.” Id. § 
13101(A)-(B). 
23
 Id. § 13100(A). 
24
 Id. § 13100(E). 
25
 Id. § 13300(A)(1). 
26
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13300(a)(2) (2009). 
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recent enactment of Proposition 9, courts have yet to offer guidance on how 
the statute should be interpreted. In the meantime, state and county agencies 
should establish very clear procedures on how to tag, exclude, or excise this 
information so that the general public and/or defense does not gain access.27  
The Victims’ Bill of Rights is discussed in greater detail infra in Part IV. 
 
Generally speaking, disclosure of summary criminal justice information 
to other criminal justice agencies will expose an agency to no liability, 
particularly if both have access to CLETS.  
 
A.  Disclosure of Summary Information to California Criminal Justice 
Agencies 
 
Criminal justice agencies in California are required to compile local 
summary criminal history information.  The California Penal Code defines 
criminal justice agencies as “those agencies at all levels of government 
which perform as their principle functions, activities which either: (a) relate 
to the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, incarceration, or correction 
of criminal offenders; or (b) relate to the collection, storage, dissemination 
or usage of criminal offender record information.” Id. § 13101(A)-(B). 
 
Penal Code Section 13300(1) sets for the requirements for collecting 
and disseminating selected “local summary criminal history information.”28 
A local criminal justice agency must, upon request, share local summary 
criminal history information with selected parties, including public 
defenders and attorneys of record, district attorneys, courts, probation 
officers, and the former criminal offender.29    And these sections of the 
Penal Code are intimately tied to Government Code Section 15152 et seq., 
establishing the CLETS system, because they clarify the data elements to be 
                                                 
27
 The VBR creates three sets of issues for criminal justice information sharing, and 
these issues vary in their relevance and clarity. 
First, many provisions of the VBR involve certain “criminal procedure rights” for 
victims, including the ability to participate in legal proceedings and to confer with 
prosecutors over the disposition of cases.  On the whole, these provisions, though important 
and controversial, have no bearing on the information issues in this Primer. 
Second, the VBR grants victims a right to be informed of certain aspects of the case as 
it proceeds.  This set of rights involves a kind of required information-sharing.  Because 
this information is usually public anyway, the rights simply accelerate disclosure and 
personal notice. 
Finally, and most relevant to this Primer, the VBR sets limits on disclosure of certain 
categories of information about victims.  The bulk of this section deals with those 
restrictions. 
28
 Id. § 13300(3)(B)(1)-(16).  
29
 Id. § 13300(3)(B)(1)-(16).  
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used in criminal justice databases accessible via CLETS. 
 
The aspect of CLETS most relevant to this Primer is the secondary 
dissemination of CLETS information.  (Agencies regularly share data 
through joint agreements30 or under regional arrangements that disseminate 
data across many different jurisdictions, most notably through Regional 
Information Sharing Systems (RISS)).  The California Department of 
Justice explicitly allows secondary dissemination of information accessed 
through CLETS, provided certain regulations are followed.31  RISS users, 
who are funded by the federal government, must similarly comply with 
federal privacy regulations prior to secondary dissemination.32  These 
security regulations do not prevent secondary data sharing entirely, but must 
be incorporated into joint power agreements or contracts with third-party 
vendors in order to protect privacy and security concerns. 
 
The California Attorney General is “responsible for the security of 
criminal record information” and is required to enact regulations to protect 
criminal records from “unauthorized access and disclosure.”33  Information 
can be shared only when it is “demonstrably required” for “an agency’s or 
official’s functions.”34  Secondary dissemination of CLETS information to 
other law enforcement agencies, including federal agencies, is proper if a 
"compelling need" is demonstrated and "the information is needed for the 
performance of their official duties."35   The California DOJ defines the 
criterion for release – release occurs “on a need-to-know basis . . . to 
persons or agencies authorized by court order, statute, or decisional law to 
receive criminal offender record information.”36  These security 
                                                 
30
 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 2. 
31
 DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CLETS POLICIES, PRACTICES 
AND PROCEDURES §1.6.4(J) (Draft Oct. 2008) [hereinafter CLETS PPPS] 
(“Secondary dissemination and remote access to data accessed via the CLETS 
using communications media (including the Internet) is allowed when a minimum 
set of administrative and technical requirements that include the encryption and 
firewall requirements . . . are met. . . . Any secondary dissemination of the data 
must be secure and only to those who are authorized to receive the data.”). 
32
 “Each RISS center must comply with DOJ, BJA Program Guidelines. 
Information retained in RISS criminal intelligence databases must also comply 
with the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (Federal Regulation 28 
CFR Part 23).” Regional Information Sharing Systems, 
http://www.riss.net/overview.aspx (last visited March 20, 2009).  
33
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11077 (2009). 
34
 Id. 
35
 See id. §11105(c)(5). 
36
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 703 (2009). 
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requirements apply not only to the records maintained by the California 
DOJ, but also to criminal justice records containing CLETS material 
maintained by any local or state criminal justice agency.37 
 
To ensure that agencies conform to applicable security requirements 
when accessing CLETS data, the California legislature has directed the 
Attorney General to establish an Advisory Committee to draft CLETS 
“Policies, Practices and Procedures” (PPPs).38  The PPPs classify CLETS 
information as “confidential,” and, tracking the regulatory language, limit 
access to “authorized law enforcement or criminal justice personnel” on a 
“right-to-know and need-to-know” basis.39   
 
B.  Disclosure of Summary Information to Criminal Justice Agencies 
Outside the State of California 
 
Agencies that wish to access CLETS data in the first instance must 
apply to become subscribers of CLETS and win approval by the Advisory 
Committee.40  Because the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are officially certified subscribers, both 
agencies are treated like state criminal justice agencies, openly sharing 
relevant CLETS information for active investigations.41 
 
In sum, California officials who are part of CLETS can be confident 
that any secondary dissemination of CLETS information to another state or 
                                                 
37
 Criminal Record Information is defined as “records and data compiled by 
criminal justice agencies for purposes of identifying criminal offenders and of 
maintaining as to each such offender a summary of arrests, pretrial proceedings, 
the nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, incarceration, 
rehabilitation, and release.” CAL PENAL CODE §11075 
38
 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 15154, 15160 (2009). 
39
 CLETS PPPS, supra note 31, at § 1.6.4. 
40
 Id. at §1.3 (listing the FBI as a Class I authorized subscriber, and also listing 
non-law enforcement personnel under Class II and III levels). 
41 Even when local authorities share non-CLETS information with federal 
authorities for law enforcement purposes, including information from Records 
Management Systems or Computer Aided Dispatch, there is little danger of being 
sued for invasion of privacy.  If the information is public record, for instance, the 
disclosure would be controlled by the CPRA, discussed in Part III.  If a federal 
agent uses the information illegally, that agent, not the local authority, would be 
responsible for the illegal activity.  There are few other legal remedies for alleged 
privacy violations as a result of disclosure.  See, e.g., Hilary Hylton, Fusion 
Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information, TIME, Mar. 9, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883101,00.html. 
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federal law enforcement agency for a legitimate law enforcement purpose 
will not create legal liability, so long as they comply with CLETS security 
rules, discussed in Section C infra.  Those rules are somewhat technical and 
complex, especially those concerning who is a subscriber agency and when 
information can be released to a non-subscriber agency with a need to know 
related to law enforcement.  The key to compliance is for all officials with 
power over CLETS information to be familiar with the rules in the latest 
CLETS PPPs.  That document contains a user-friendly guide to the rules, 
along with sample forms for situations like the release of information to 
non-subscribers. 
 
C.  Disclosure of Summary Information to California Agencies that are not 
part of the Criminal Justice System 
 
Once an agency, federal or local, has access to CLETS, it must 
comply with the confidentiality policies and technical security requirements 
of the PPPs.  Agencies cannot access or secondarily release CLETS 
information “for non-law enforcement purposes . . . unless otherwise 
mandated,” and, if they do, they are “subject to administrative action and/or 
criminal prosecution.”42  Secondary dissemination of CLETS data, 
particularly through regional or interagency sharing arrangements, 
moreover, must comply with electronic security requirements, including 
“encryption and firewall” protections.  Secondary dissemination specifically 
requires that CLETS information be released only to “those who are 
[otherwise] authorized to receive the data,” specifically an agency that is a 
valid law-enforcement organization with a need-to-know or right-to-
know.43  This limitation generally prevents local police departments from 
sharing CLETS derived information with organizations like local health 
providers or human service agencies, which are not law enforcement 
agencies with a right to access CLETS data directly. 
 
III. MEDICAL INFORMATION: INFORMATION SHARING AND THE HEALTH 
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) 
 
                                                 
42
 CLETS PPPs, supra note 31, at §§ 1.6.4; 1.10; see also CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 11141-11144 (2009) (explaining that Department of Justice employees who 
give (or receive) criminal history information to unauthorized parties is guilty of a 
misdemeanor); Id. § 13302 (2009) (local criminal justice agency employees are 
guilty of misdemeanor when furnish a criminal record to unauthorized individual). 
Officials, however, would have a defense if the transfer of information were 
necessary for the apprehension of a person suspected of a crime.  Id. § 13304(c). 
43
 CLETS PPPS, supra note 31, at § 1.6.4. 
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Criminal justice agencies want information about the health needs of 
people under their care or supervision.  The issue in this section deals 
primarily with health care providers’ reported reluctance to share medical 
information out of the belief that it will compromise patient privacy under 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).    
The HIPAA “Privacy Rule,” which took effect in 2001, regulates the use 
and disclosure of health information held by covered entities.44   Generally, 
HIPAA requires an individual’s valid authorization to reveal the 
individual’s “Protected Health Information,” which is broadly defined to 
include any information concerning the person’s health status, provision of 
medical care, or payment for care that can in any way be identified to him 
or her.45   One component of HIPAA deals with individuals’ entitlement to 
get their own medical information from covered entities. Another confirms 
that individuals can consent to or authorize disclosure of medical 
information to third parties, although even then the covered entity is 
required to limit any such disclosure to the minimum necessary to 
accomplish the intended purpose motivating the person’s permission.46  Of 
key relevance to this Primer are HIPAA’s provisions that permit disclosure 
to third parties without the individual’s permission.47  
 
  Many officials are generally aware of HIPAA and understandably 
worry that it may constrain their use of information about individual 
records, but these concerns are largely unfounded.  These default rules are 
punctuated with an array of exceptions that make HIPAA “a maze of 
intertwined and interlocking puzzle pieces”48 but the ultimate inference to 
be drawn from this legal maze is fairly straightforward: HIPAA rarely poses 
challenges to officials in criminal justice agencies if they use medical 
information for any conventional criminal justice purpose. 
 
HIPAA only directly applies to “covered entities.”  These include 
                                                 
44
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH 
INFORMATION PRIVACY: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2009), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2009). 
45
 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2009). 
46
 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2009). 
47
 Such disclosure is often described as “unauthorized” disclosure, although 
that term is confusing.  It is not authorized by the individual but may be authorized 
by statute or regulation. 
48
 Tamela J. White & Charlotte A. Hoffman, The Privacy Standards Under the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: A Practical Guide to 
Promote Order and Avoid Potential Chaos. 106 W. VA. L. REV. 709, 712 (2004). 
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(1) health plans (such as health insurance companies or Medicaid), (2) 
health care clearinghouses (entities that process nonstandard health 
information, such as billing companies that convert information into data 
content); and (3) health care providers (such as hospitals and doctors).49   
Thus, justice agencies like courts and law enforcement agencies will rarely 
generate the information that is protected by the HIPAA privacy rule.  
Normally, the only “covered entities” within the justice system will be 
prisons or jails directly providing health care.  In such cases, the medical 
personnel in the place of incarceration need to be aware of HIPAA, just as if 
they were working in civilian hospitals or clinics, and their non-medical 
supervisors will have to ensure that the medical personnel remain in 
compliance. 
 
HIPAA, as a result, mainly affects criminal justice agencies in their 
role as potential receivers of medical information from covered entities:  
health care providers might be reluctant to release information to 
governmental agencies because those providers fear liability under HIPAA.  
The key concern in this section is how covered providers can be assured 
that justice agencies who receive information are complying with HIPAA in 
their inter-agency information sharing and therefore do not expose the 
entities to liability.  
 
A.  HIPAA Liability for Covered Entities 
 
 Despite the concerns of health care providers, HIPAA penalties have 
rarely been imposed.  Criminal justice agencies seeking health care 
information must nevertheless expect covered entities to be risk-averse to 
extensive information disclosure and potential liability.  The criminal 
justice agencies must, as a result, be conversant with the rules and 
exceptions in HIPAA to assure providers that they will not risk liability by 
improperly transferring information. 
 
Illustrative civil penalties for a single HIPAA violation by an 
institution (referred to as a violation of an “identical requirement or 
prohibition”) can be up to $25,000 a year.50 Depending on how narrowly 
the phrase “identical requirement or prohibition” is construed, the 
maximum annual penalty could be many times more than $25,000.51  
                                                 
49
 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009). 
50
 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2000). 
51
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH 
INFORMATION PRIVACY: CASE EXAMPLES AND RESOLUTION AGREEMENTS 
(2009), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/index.html 
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HIPAA also includes penalties for individuals who violate the statute, 
including a $50,000 fine and up to one year in prison for a knowing 
violation, and a $250,000 fine and up to ten years in prison for a violation 
for financial gain.52  
 
 Despite these statutory penalties, HIPAA is rarely enforced.53  
Violations are not enforced in court because the statute contains no private 
right of action.54  In fact, an individual’s only response to a perceived 
HIPAA violation is to file a complaint with the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS).55  In the past, HHS has been extremely reluctant to 
impose penalties – not one of the thousands of complaints filed before 2008 
resulted in a single penalty being imposed.56  As of March 31, 2009, HHS 
has received over 43,052 HIPAA privacy complaints.  HHS has dismissed 
the vast majority of these cases and resolved the others by requiring entities 
to implement new policies.57  HHS has imposed sanctions a mere two 
times.58  
 
                                                                                                                            
(last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (referring to case where sanctions are imposed as 
“resolution agreements”). 
52
 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b) (2000). 
53
 Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, 
at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/04/AR2006060400672.html 
54
 Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006); see also 45 CFR § 
160.306(a) (2009). 
55
 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2009). 
56
 JOHN PETRILA, NAT’L GAINS CTR., DISPELLING MYTHS ABOUT 
INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN THE MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS 4 (2007); see also Joshua D.W. Collins, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for 
a Private Right of Action to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV. 
199, 202 n.15 (2007). 
57
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH 
INFORMATION PRIVACY: ENFORCEMENT HIGHLIGHTS (2009), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2009).  
58
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra 
note 212 (referring to case where sanctions are imposed as “resolution 
agreements”). Criminal sanctions have been similarly sparse. As of March, 2009, 
there have been eight criminal convictions under HIPAA; in each case, the 
convicted individual used private medical information for personal financial gain. 
See Rebecca Herold, HIPAA Criminal Convictions Outpace Sanctions, 
SEARCHCOMPLIANCE.COM, Mar. 23, 2009, 
http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid195_gci1351658,00.html. 
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Despite the rarity of sanctions, government agencies might face 
significant challenges when seeking information from health care providers.  
HHS has the power to change its tactics any time.  In fact, there are some 
signs that enforcement is rising: both instances of sanctions were recent 
(July 16th, 2008 and January 16th, 2009).59   Even more troubling, the 
sanctions were significant ($100,000 for failing to safeguard information 
against theft and loss, and a $2.25 million against CVS for failing to dispose 
properly of protected health information and for failing to sanction 
employees who violated HIPAA).  In the approximately 8,000 other cases 
not dismissed for lack of merit, however, HHS has simply directed 
providers to change their policies.60    
 
 Criminal justice agencies can utilize several arguments to reassure 
health care entities reluctant to produce information.  Even if the HHS 
accelerates enforcement, it is highly unlikely that it would impose penalties 
on entities collaborating with governmental agencies in good faith, 
particularly those in the criminal justice system.61  But the best assurance 
that a criminal justice agency can give a health care provider is that that the 
request is explicitly permissible under HIPAA.  The key, therefore, is that 
criminal justice agencies understand the HIPAA exceptions. 
 
B.  HIPAA Exceptions 
 
HIPAA presumptively requires an individual’s valid authorization to 
                                                 
59
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra 
note 212 (referring to case where sanctions are imposed as “resolution 
agreements”). 
60
 Id.; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
supra note 219. 
61
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH 
INFORMATION PRIVACY: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (2009), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2009) (“Covered entities may rely on professional ethics and best 
judgments in deciding which of these permissive uses and disclosures to make.”); 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH 
INFORMATION PRIVACY: ALL CASE EXAMPLES (2009), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/allcases.html#case17 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2009). 
In this case, a chain pharmacy violated HIPAA in impermissible uses and 
disclosures to law enforcement officials. OCR directed the chain to revise its 
policy, revealing information “only in response to written requests from law 
enforcement officials.” 
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reveal that individual’s health information 62  and, as noted, the covered 
entity must also limit any information it discloses to the minimum necessary 
to accomplish the purpose intended by the individual.63   But exceptions to 
HIPAA delineate a subset of information that may be released without 
authorization in particular circumstances; those relevant here are 
disclosures:  
 
1. To a correctional institution and other law enforcement custodial 
situations;64  
2. For treatment purposes;65 
3. To the extent that disclosure is required by law;66 
4. About victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence;67 
5. For judicial and administrative proceedings;68 
6. To avert a serious threat to health or safety;69 
7. For law enforcement purposes.70  
 
As discussed more below, HIPAA will sometimes permit disclosure 
if a particular state law mandates it.  This principle raises an unusual 
inconsistency under HIPAA.  On the one hand, the HIPAA exceptions do 
not allow the disclosure of notes taken during a private counseling session, 
which always require authorization.71   On the other hand, California’s 
Tarasoff principle requires a psychotherapist to disclose information from a 
private counseling conversation when the client poses a potential danger to 
others.72  This requirement, in turn, triggers HIPAA’s exception for a use or 
disclosure that is required by law, meaning that the notes can be disclosed 
without fear of HIPAA sanctions.73  (This particular example would also 
trigger the HIPAA exception for avoiding a threat to public safety, 
                                                 
62
 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2009). 
63
 Id. § 164.502(b). 
64
 Id. § 164.512(k)(5). 
65
 Id. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii). 
66
 Id. § 164.512(a). 
67
 Id. § 164.512(c). 
68
 Id. § 164.512(e). 
69
 Id. § 164.512(j). 
70
 Id. § 164.512(f). 
71
 Id. § 164.508(2).  
72
 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) 
(“[T]he public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-
psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is 
essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public 
peril begins.”). 
73
 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1) (2009). 
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discussed infra at 23.) 
 
Key aspects of the HIPAA exceptions include: 
 
1. A Custodial Situation 
 
A covered entity may disclose protected health information to a 
correctional institution or a law enforcement official who has lawful 
custody over an individual.74 When an individual ceases to be in lawful 
custody (for instance, when he begins parole or supervised release), these 
provisions no longer apply.75  While the individual is in custody, disclosure 
may be made only insofar as necessary for: 
 
1. Providing health care to the individual; 
 
2. The health and safety of the individual, other inmates, employees, or 
others at the correctional institution; 
 
3. The health and safety of those transporting the individual; 
 
4. Law enforcement on premises of a correctional institution, or the 
maintenance of safety, security and good order of the correctional 
institution.76 
 
This exception will encompass a wide array of desired uses of 
medical information.  But it only applies while the individual is in custody; 
it will not reach individuals who are on community supervision, and it 
focuses on treatment or general safety purposes, not law enforcement 
broadly defined.  Moreover, it is unclear whether dealing with an 
individual’s drug or mental health problems will always qualify as 
treatment or as necessary for safety.  Nevertheless, even this limited 
exception will encompass many desired uses, and citing this exception can 
be effective in reassuring reluctant covered entities to release information. 
 
2. For Treatment Purposes 
 
Unauthorized disclosure is permitted “for treatment activities of a 
health care provider.”77 The regulations do not stipulate who qualifies as a 
                                                 
74
 Id. § 164.512(k)(5)(i). 
75
 Id. § 164.512(k)(5)(iii). 
76
 Id. § 164.512(k)(5)(i). 
77
 Id. § 154.506(c)(2). 
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health care provider. They do specify that “[a] covered entity may disclose 
protected health information to another covered entity or a health care 
provider for the payment activities”78 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
regulations seem to contemplate a health care provider who is not a covered 
entity. If a health care provider is broadly defined, many aspects of criminal 
justice information sharing could fall into this exception. It is possible that 
even a police officer acting as a treatment facilitator could qualify as “a 
health care provider” who is not a covered entity. In the absence of case law 
interpreting this language, however, it is unclear whether the regulations 
intend this broad reading.  
 
3. Disclosure Required by Law 
 
A covered entity may use or disclose protected information to the 
extent that such use or disclosure is required by another law.79 In disclosing 
the information required by another law, “the covered entity must simply 
comply with the requirements of the other law.”80 This is a broad exception; 
“law” includes “the full array of binding legal authority, such as 
constitutions, statutes, rules, regulations. . . . It encompasses federal, state or 
local actions with legally binding effect.”81 
 
This exception would facilitate receiving information from outside 
agencies whenever a law requires disclosure. Thus, if California passes a 
law requiring disclosure of medical information, for instance in response to 
a written request by a governmental agency, virtually all legal hurdles 
would be eliminated. This requirement would satisfy HIPAA.  It would, as 
discussed below, also satisfy requirements of the Confidential Medical 
Information Act (CMIA). The only limitation requires that the use be 
reasonable so as not to violate the right to privacy under the California 
Constitution.82 
 
4. Victims of Abuse, Neglect, or Domestic Violence 
 
Information about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence 
may be disclosed only when disclosure is expressly authorized by law.  The 
                                                 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. § 164.512(a)(1). 
80
 Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Freudenthal, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (D. 
Wyo. 2006) (citing Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 
2d 877, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2005)). 
81
 Id. 
82
 See note 286, infra, and accompanying text. 
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victim, moreover, must be unable to agree to the disclosure because of 
incapacity.  Disclosure may also be justified if it is necessary to prevent 
serious harm to the victim or other potential victims.83   
 
5. For Judicial and Administrative Proceedings 
 
In the course of a judicial or administrative proceeding, a covered 
entity may disclose protected information expressly authorized by a court 
order.84 It may also reveal information in response to a subpoena, discovery 
request, or “other lawful process.”85 In this case, California law requires 
that the requesting party serve a Consumer Notice to the individual whose 
records are being sought before those records can be disclosed.86 As 
discussed below, having judges issue standing court orders mandating the 
sharing of relevant information is a possible way to avoid HIPAA concerns. 
This is a particularly useful tool because, under California law, entities are 
required rather than simply permitted to disclose information pursuant to a 
court order.87  Thus, if a county has a standing court order that medical 
records of arrested individuals be released to the arresting officer, a health 
care provider will be required, rather than simply permitted, to disclose the 
medical record.  
 
Note that these exceptions establish that even when HIPAA operates 
as a confidentiality law—i.e., limiting out-of-court disclosure—it does not 
serve as an evidentiary privilege law (see, supra, Part VI. C.).  That is, the 
covered entity does not have any privilege to resist providing evidence or 
testimony in a formal legal proceedings. 
 
6. To Avoid a Serious Threat to Health and Safety 
 
A covered entity may also reveal health information necessary to 
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an 
individual or to the public.88 This includes identifying or apprehending an 
individual who “appears from all circumstances” to have escaped from a 
correctional institution or other lawful custody.89 It may also be used to 
identify an individual who confessed to participating in a violent crime, 
                                                 
83
 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c) (2009). 
84
 Id. § 164.512(e)(i). 
85
 Id. § 164.512(e)(ii). 
86
 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1985.3 (2005). 
87
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b) (2009). 
88
 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2009). 
89
 Id. § 164.512(j)(1)(ii)(B). 
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unless the confession was made through a request by the individual to 
receive counseling90 or during treatment to reduce the propensity to commit 
such a crime.91 The release must be made to a person able to prevent or 
lessen the threat, such as a police officer or the target of the threat.92 The 
releasable information is limited to the statement itself, and identifying 
information such as the individual’s name and physical appearance.93  
 
7. Law Enforcement Purposes 
 
Under certain circumstances, a covered entity “may disclose health 
information for a law enforcement purpose to a law enforcement official.”94  
Besides circumstances that fall into one of the previously addressed 
exceptions, disclosure is also permitted, subject to the Victims’ Bill of 
Rights, when:  
 
1. The individual is suspected of being the victim of a crime, and the 
covered entity is unable to obtain permission to release from the 
individual. Further, the information must be necessary to investigate 
the crime;95 or 
 
2. The individual is dead, and the covered entity has a suspicion that 
such death may have resulted from criminal conduct;96 or 
 
3. The information is evidence of criminal conduct that occurred on the 
premises of the covered entity;97 or 
 
4. There is a medical emergency, not on the premises of the covered 
entity, and release of the information is necessary to report the 
nature or location of a crime, or the identities of those involved in a 
crime.98 
 
C.  Policy Suggestions for Information Sharing Under HIPAA 
 
                                                 
90
 Id. § 164.512(j)(2)(ii). 
91
 Id. § 164.512(j)(2)(i). 
92
 Id. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(B). 
93
 Id. § 164.512(j)(3). 
94
 Id. § 164.512(f). 
95
 Id. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii). 
96
 Id. § 164.512(f)(4). 
97
 Id. § 164.512(f)(5). 
98
 Id. § 164.512(f)(6). 
12 Dec. 2010] DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER 25 
Because there is always the threat of sanctions, even “toothless”99 
HIPAA provisions can interfere with information sharing. Where 
information does not clearly fall into one of the HIPAA exceptions, or 
where only some of the information falls into an exception, several options 
remain.  
 
• HHS Advisory Opinion: The best solution is for the HHS to issue an 
advisory opinion that HIPAA will not be enforced against criminal 
justice information sharing. The HHS could posit that such sharing 
would fall within HIPAA, that it will simply not enforce HIPAA 
provisions against entities responding to governmental requests for 
information, or even that it will limit any interference to policy 
recommendation rather than sanctions.  
 
• State or Local Law Requiring Disclosure: California could pass a 
law (or several local laws can be passed) requiring disclosure to 
governmental agencies.  
 
• Uniform Consent Forms:100 An individual entering the criminal 
justice system could sign a form listing all relevant entities who can 
receive the information (e.g. parole officers, police officers, prison 
officials), thus obtaining the individual’s consent for each entity on 
the list. An individual could either check a box next to each entity or 
could sign a statement that he authorizes disclosure to ‘all the 
entities listed above.’  
 
• Judicial Order: Another option used in some jurisdictions is for 
judges to create judicial orders with standard language mandating 
the sharing of information with relevant entities.101 To comply with 
California law, a Consumer Notice would have to be delivered to the 
individual before records are disclosed.102  
 
• Case-by-case Clarification for Outside Agencies: Before one of the 
above approaches takes effect, criminal justice agencies could 
persuade outside agencies to share information by citing the low 
enforceability of HIPAA or a relevant exception that makes the 
disclosure permissible.  
                                                 
99
 Collins, supra note 58, at 199. 
100
 PETRILA, supra note 58, at 3. 
101
 Id. 
102
 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1985.3 (2005). 
26 DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER [12 Dec. 2010] 
 
D.  State Law and the Confidential Medical Information Act (CMIA) 
 
Because the enforceability of HIPAA has been limited, many of the 
problems of information sharing might, instead, arise directly under relevant 
state law. California’s version of HIPAA is the Confidentiality of Medical 
Information Act (CMIA). Under CMIA, a patient who is harmed through 
unlawful disclosure can receive monetary damages. CMIA provides that 
violations are misdemeanors;103 it entitles the patient to compensatory 
damages, up to $3,000 in punitive damages, up to $1,000 in attorney’s fees, 
and litigation costs.104 
 
A key question is when HIPAA preempts provisions of state law. In 
the abstract, federal law, under the Supremacy Clause, preempts state law 
whenever the two are contradictory.  But that abstract principle is very 
difficult to apply in specific instances, because whether two laws are 
contradictory or mutually inconsistent cannot always be derived from 
statutory language; it requires reference to the statutes’ manifest purposes 
and operations. 
 
Like some other complex federal laws, the HIPAA Privacy rules 
contain their own preemption rules.  They look dauntingly complex 
themselves, but their implications are fairly clear. 
 
The best way to imagine the preemption rule is as follows: since 
HIPAA’s purpose is to guide officials of covered entities in regard to 
disclosure, first one asks whether a state official faces any contradiction in 
complying with both HIPAA and the state law in question.  If doing 
something she is permitted or required to do under state law would require 
her to simultaneously violate HIPAA, then federal law nullifies the state 
law. Thus, in general terms, if a state law permits or requires a disclosure of 
protected medical information where HIPAA bars it, then the official must 
comply with the HIPAA bar. 
 
  HIPAA, nevertheless, contains provisions whereby an apparent 
preemption is overcome.  For example, when a state rule appears 
preempted, the Secretary of HHS can still defer to the state law.  In such 
situations, it is necessary that the Secretary seek to prevent abuse in health 
care or regulation of health insurance, and that there be a compelling public 
                                                 
103
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.36 (2009). 
104
 Id. 
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safety justification as balanced against privacy (unless the state law is more 
stringent in its protections). 
 
Thus, HIPAA preempts a contrary state law only insofar as the state 
law provision is less stringent than HIPAA.105  The more restrictive 
provision between HIPAA and state law will consequently govern. HIPAA 
provisions are more restrictive in a majority of cases. A few particularly 
relevant distinctions between HIPAA and CMIA are: 
 
 
• CMIA allows broad disclosure for medical purposes, including 
disclosure to health care providers, service plans, contractors, 
and “other health care professionals or facilities,” and permits 
disclosure for diagnosis as well as treatment.106 This exception is 
more likely to encompass activities of criminal justice agents 
than HIPAA, which allows disclosure only for treatment and 
only to a health care provider.107  HIPAA would thus apply. 
 
• A section of CMIA added in 2007 allows disclosure of medical 
information to a county social worker, a probation officer, or any 
other person legally authorized to have custody or care of a 
minor for purposes of coordinating health care services and 
medical treatment for the minor.108 HIPAA does not specifically 
address parole officers, but allows disclosure to anyone acting 
“in loco parentis,” unless the only consent required is the 
consent of the unanticipated minor.109  HIPAA would thus apply. 
 
• CMIA requires, rather than simply permits disclosure pursuant 
to a court order or a search warrant.110 CMIA would thus apply. 
 
HIPAA provisions are the more restrictive in a majority of cases, 
but—likely due to the lack of a private right of action and general low 
enforceability of HIPAA—California cases about disclosure of medical 
information consider only state law.111 In a 2006 case, for instance, the 
                                                 
105
 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2009). 
106
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(c)(1) (2009). 
107
 45 C.F.R. § 154.506(c)(2) (2009). 
108
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.103 (2009). 
109
 45 C.F.R. 164.502(g)(1)(3) (2009). 
110
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b) (2009). 
111
 See, e.g., Cal. Consumer Health Care Council v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 
Inc., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 593, 597 (Ct. App. 2006) (ruling based on exception in 
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court held that release of medical information to attorneys was authorized 
by CMIA despite plaintiffs’ claim that some of the information was 
irrelevant. The court held that “the Legislature specifically elected not to 
graft a relevancy limitation onto the section 56.10(c)(4) exception.” 
However, an exception without a relevancy limitation is preempted by 
HIPAA’s more stringent “minimum necessary” requirement. Technically, 
HIPAA governed and the plaintiffs should have prevailed. Yet the court did 
not address the issue, nor did the decision mention HIPAA.112  
 
Insofar as California law governs even where HIPAA would be 
more stringent, CMIA offers a simple solution. It holds that “information 
may be disclosed when the disclosure is otherwise specifically authorized 
by law, including, but not limited to, the voluntary reporting” to the FDA.113 
This exception applies whenever a law indicates that disclosure should 
occur. Courts have interpreted the “authorized by law” exception very 
broadly. In Shaddox v. Bertani, a dentist reported his suspicions that a 
police officer patient had a prescription drug problem to the officer’s 
superiors.114 The court held that the dentist’s actions were lawful because 
city charter provisions encouraged reporting of complaints of police 
misconduct. This qualified as “specifically authorized,” although the 
provisions did not mention medical information. Shaddox also indicates that 
CMIA governs: it explicitly acknowledged HIPAA,115 but decided the case 
solely by reference to CMIA.116  
 
The best option to satisfy CMIA would be to pass a law at the city, county, 
or state level that authorizes disclosure of medical information. Under 
Shaddox, this law could simply be a statement that the State of California 
encourages criminal justice information sharing. A legal authorization 
                                                                                                                            
CMIA, although the CMIA exception would be preempted by HIPAA’s minimum 
necessary standard); Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assoc. of Thousand Oaks 
(2005) 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 439, 443 (Ct. App. 2005) (.holding that a clinic’s 
disclosure of medical information to ex-fiancé was authorized under CMIA 
56.10(c)(2) when the patient used ex-fiancé’s credit card to pay at health clinic, 
even though the disclosure technically violated HIPAA’s requirement that payment 
information be released only to a health care provider or other covered entity (45 
C.F.R. § 154.506(c)(2)). 
112
 Cal. Consumer Health Care, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597. 
113
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(c)(12) (2009). 
114
 Shaddox v. Bertani, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 808, 817 (Ct. App. 2003). 
115
 Id. (mentioning the passage of HIPAA as an example of “concerns about 
medical privacy”). 
116
 Id. at 814-15. 
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would trigger the 56.10(c)(4) exception. Though it wouldn’t satisfy HIPAA, 
California case law indicates that HIPAA does not normally come into play 
in California cases. Moreover, an explicit authorization at the state level 
would make any adverse action by the HHS under HIPAA even more 
unlikely. 
 
IV.  VICTIMS’ ISSUES 
 
The California Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBR) changes the information 
exchange landscape in two ways.  First, it grants crime victims the right to 
access summary information.  Second, it limits the disclosure of 
information about victims.  Each will be discussed in turn. 
 
A.  Disclosure of Summary Information to Victims 
 
Proposition 8 (the Victims’ Bill of Rights) was passed in 1982 and 
amended the California Constitution.  It also enacted several statutes, 
including those concerned with the rights victims to be notified in advance 
of sentencing and parole hearings, as well as to participate in and offer a 
victim statement in these hearings.117  Proposition 9 (Victims’ Rights and 
Protection Act), more commonly known as Marsy’s Law, was approved in 
2008 with the goal of broadening  victims’ rights and making them more 
enforceable.  The 2008 law provides a basic definition of what it means to 
be a victim under the law,118 and, through Penal Code Section 679.026(b), 
provides that a victim has the right to receive, without cost or charge, a 
complete list of the rights recognized in Section 28 of Article I of the 
California Constitution.119 The various rights established by Proposition 9 
                                                 
117
 Most notably, Proposition 8 added Section 28 to Article 1 of the 
Constitution and created Penal Code Section 1191.1, which established the right of 
crime victims to obtain restitution from the perpetrator. 
118
 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b)(17)(e) (2008). 
119
 Proposition 9 is not a standalone provision for victims’ rights. It is designed 
to be a part of a cohesive framework of victims’ rights. Proposition 9 Initiative 
Measure § 7 (Conflicts with Existing Law) states the following: “It is the intent of 
the People of the State of California in enacting this act that if any provision in this 
act conflicts with an existing provision of law which provides for greater rights of 
victims of crimes, the latter provision shall apply.” CA PROP. 9 (2008). See also 
CAL. PENAL CODE SECTION 13835(A)-(F) (2008) (“[T]here is a need to develop 
methods to reduce the trauma and insensitive treatment that victims and witnesses 
may experience in the wake of a crime, since all too often citizens who become 
involved with the criminal justice system, either as victims or witnesses to crime, 
are further victimized by that system. . . . It is, therefore, the intent of the 
Legislature to provide services to meet the needs of both victims and witnesses of 
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are constitutionally protected and enforceable in any trial or appellate 
court.120 
 
 In general, Proposition 9 expanded the notification and participation 
rights of victims in criminal justice proceedings previously mandated by 
Proposition 8.121  Under Proposition 9, victims must be notified of all 
criminal proceedings including pretrial proceedings and the transfer or 
release of defendants, whereas Proposition 8 only required criminal justice 
agencies to notify victims about upcoming sentencing and parole hearings.  
Prosecutors are now required to take reasonable steps to confer with crime 
victims about its charging decisions and developments related to the filing 
of charges.122   These participatory and conferral rights are important, and 
they have created controversy over whether they unduly impinge on the 
prosecutor’s prerogative.123 Nevertheless, they do not, by themselves, raise 
                                                                                                                            
crime through the funding of local comprehensive centers for victim and witness 
assistance.”).  
120
 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(C)(1) (2008) (“A victim, the retained attorney of a 
victim, a lawful representative of the victim, or the prosecuting attorney upon 
request of the victim, may enforce the above rights in any trial or appellate court 
with jurisdiction over the case as a matter of right. The court shall act promptly on 
such request.”). 
121
 See generally, Harriet Salarno, Prop. 9 Expands Crime Victim’s Rights, SF 
CHRONICLE, Oct. 9, 2008, at B7; LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, HEARING 
HANDOUT, PROPOSITION 9: VICTIM’S BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF 2008: MARSY’S 
LAW (Sept. 23, 2008) (presented to the Assembly and Senate Public Safety 
Committees), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/LAOApp/PubDetails.aspx?id=1885 (last visited on Mar. 18, 
2009).  
122
 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b)(6) (2008).  
123
 It is unclear whether the new conferral rights afforded to victims will 
impinge on a prosecutor’s objectivity and independence. A victim’s right to 
“reasonably confer” with the prosecution is somewhat ambiguous: Does it mean 
that a prosecutor is simply required to ask for input from the victim?  Is the 
prosecutor required to do more than keep an open line of communication with a 
victim? The chief concern regarding the conferral rights created under Article 1, 
Section 28(b)(6) of the Constitution is that prosecutors have more nuanced 
understandings of criminal proceedings and may face increasing pressure from a 
victim to adopt a certain course (i.e., what charges should be in an indictment).  
Even if a victim is knowledgeable about the legal and practical obligations that 
shape a prosecutor’s duties and the victim understands the procedural minutia of 
the criminal justice system, a victim may lack an objective outlook. Consequently, 
a victim may not make prudent requests for prosecutorial action and may 
unjustifiably expect more deference in opinion from a prosecutor.  Although 
Article 1, Section 28(b)(6) of the Constitution formalized conferral rights, a 
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issues related to confidential information. 
 
When Article 1, Section 28(b)(6) of the Constitution is read in 
conjunction with Article 1, Section 28(b)(7) and Article 1, Section 28(b)(8) 
of the Constitution, the victim essentially has full access to material 
dispositional information about the offender.124  Proposition 9 did not 
eliminate any of the pre-existing victims’ rights to access offender 
information. Instead, Proposition 9 augmented many of the pre-existing 
rights that afforded access. As a result, victims can obtain information about 
an offender either formally (information provided directly to the victim by a 
representative of a criminal justice agency) or informally (information 
gained firsthand through attendance at a criminal proceeding in which the 
victim elects to participate).125    
 
Since most of the information about offenders is already available in 
conventional data sharing networks, an integrated criminal justice system 
would not improve the quality of victims’ rights.  An integrated criminal 
justice system may, however, make existing information sharing networks 
more comprehensive and thereby facilitate the process of communicating 
relevant information to the parties responsible for keeping victims duly 
informed of an offender’s status.  Another major concern about the 
expanded victims’ notification and participation rights is the costs that the 
various state and local agencies will bear. Providing information and 
allowing victims to participate in all criminal proceedings will be costly.126   
 
                                                                                                                            
prosecutor is not thrust in a new or unfamiliar position of managing a victim’s 
participation. An experienced and competent prosecutor is likely to be adept at 
managing the interests and concerns of a victim, and likely conferred with victims 
in the absence of Proposition 9. The prosecutor, however, may encounter 
difficulties in the form of a victim now believing that a right to confer with the 
prosecution means he or she has a right to act as a back-seat prosecutor (i.e., 
unofficial co-counsel). 
124
 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b)(7) (2008); id. § 28(b)(8).   
125
 Victims’ rights to offender information or rights to participate in criminal 
proceedings are discussed in the several statutory provisions.  See, e.g., CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 6254(f); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02(a)(2); id. § 679.02(a)(3); id. § 
679.02(a)(4); id. § 679.02(a)(5); id. § 679.02(a)(6); id. § 679.02(a)(11); id. § 
679.02(a)(12); id. § 679.02(a)(12)(A); id. § 679.02(a)(13); id. § 679.02(a)(14); id. 
§ 680(c)(2)(C); id. § 1102.6; id. § 1191.1; id. § 1202.1(d)(1); id. § 1203.05(a)-(c); 
id. § 3043(a)(1); id. § 3043(b)(1); id. § 3058.8(a); id. § 3605(a); id. § 11116.10(a);  
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 656.2(a)-(c); id. § 676.5. 
126
 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, HEARING HANDOUT, supra 
note 122.  
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B.  Restrictions on the Disclosure of Information about Victims 
 
Data contained in case management systems might contain information 
about victims.  After the VBR, agencies will need to ensure that 
confidential information is not released to the defendant in such a way that 
it exposes the victim to potential harassment.  As amended by Proposition 
9, the VBR now protects the victim’s right: 
 
4. To prevent the disclosure of confidential information 
or records to the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, or any 
other person acting on behalf of the defendant, which could 
be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family 
or which disclose confidential communications made in the 
course of medical or counseling treatment, or which are 
otherwise privileged or confidential by law. 
 
5. To refuse an interview, deposition, or discovery 
request by the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or any 
other person acting on behalf of the defendant, and to set 
reasonable conditions on the conduct of any such interview 
to which the victim consents.127 
 
The distinction between these two guarantees is important. 
 
Right Four is a broad restriction on the power of government 
officials to disclose information about the victim where that disclosure 
meets the criteria of potential harm to the victim. 
 
Right Five limits the duty of the victim herself to disclose 
information to a criminal defendant.  The significance of the latter rule is 
deceptive until one sets the context.  As a general matter, no victim, or any 
other potential witness to a criminal case is obligated to answer any 
questions posed by the defendant or the defense team—or even to law 
enforcement.  Rather, the obligation to provide information only arises 
under some sort of court order or subpoena, as where the victim or witness 
is called to testify in a preliminary examination, grand jury hearing, or 
actual trial.  Thus, in a sense, Right Five has a symbolic redundancy.  On 
the other hand, if Right Five is meant to restrict the obligation of the victim 
to provide information even when summoned to testify, then it operates as 
an evidentiary privilege.  This question is explored in more detail below. 
                                                 
127
 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b) (2008). 
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In light of Right Four, state and county agencies may not release any 
of the following information to the public, the defendant, the defendant’s 
attorney, or to anyone else acting on behalf of the defendant:  
 
• The victim or the victim’s family members’ addresses, phone 
numbers, email addresses, or any other information that could be 
used to locate or harass the victim or victim’s family members 
 
• Confidential information from medical or counseling treatment 
provided to the victim, including the victim’s mental health record 
 
Before the passage of Proposition 9, defendants could request access 
to a victim’s confidential information, such as mental health records or 
criminal history, and the court could grant the defendant’s discovery request 
if it deemed the information relevant. The 2008 amendments to the VBR 
revoke the defendant’s right to obtain such mental health or criminal history 
information.  
 
Right Five enables the victim to refuse an interview or deposition 
request by the defense. Should the victim decide to consent to interviews, 
he may set reasonable conditions about how those interviews will be 
conducted. The victim may also refuse a discovery request by the defense.  
The defense cannot force the victim to turn over any documents, including 
the victim’s criminal history.  
 
 In light of these discovery limitations, prosecutors face conflicting 
obligations.  As discussed below in Part VI, prosecutors cannot suppress 
material exculpatory information (the Brady requirement).  The VBR, 
however, suggests that victims can refuse discovery requests, even requests 
for exculpatory information.  Because the VBR is part of the California’s 
Constitution, it arguably trumps discovery rules in both the Penal Code and 
California Supreme Court decisions.  And because the VBR applies to state 
court proceedings on issues of state law, the prosecutor would normally be 
bound to follow the VBR over federal law. Brady requirements, however, 
are elements of the United States Constitution and cannot be ignored.  
Prosecutors, consequently, must disclose material exculpatory information.  
The conflicts between Brady and the VBR require careful evaluation of 
both discovery requests and the applicable evidence to ensure compliance, 
to the extent possible, with both laws. 
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V. DISCLOSURE TO PRIVATE PARTIES UNDER SUNSHINE STATUTES 
 
This section deals with disclosure to private parties—that is, non-
governmental agencies or individuals.  Such disclosure may be mandated 
under “sunshine” statutes which promote access to government records, 
such as the California Public Records Act (CPRA) or the federal Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA).  Again, the framework used will be when the 
information must be disclosed, when it may be disclosed, and when it may 
not be disclosed.  Generally, all public records must be disclosed under the 
CPRA, which can include some criminal justice information.  The majority 
of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the CPRA in Part A, with a 
brief discussion of federal statutes in Part B. 
 
A.  The CPRA  
 
A key question for criminal justice officials is whether they are 
required to guarantee public access to information on the ground that the 
information constitutes a “public record.”   The relevant legal rules on this 
subject are embodied in the California Public Records Act (CPRA).128  In 
passing the CPRA, the Legislature found that “access to information 
concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and 
necessary right of every person in this state.”129  The law mandates 
disclosure of all public records,130 except those “exempt from disclosure by 
express provisions of law.”131   
 
Thus, in applying the CPRA, the official must determine (a) whether 
the information is in a public record, as defined by the CPRA; (b) whether 
some doctrine preempts the CPRA and removes its public record status (for 
example, the right to privacy, see below); and (c) if it remains a public 
record, whether some statutory exemption in the CPRA removes it from the 
requirement of public disclosure. 
  
Officials should note the consequences of applying the CPRA: If a 
record is covered and not exempt from disclosure, then obviously the 
question of whether the official may disclose the information is moot, 
because the official must disclose the information if asked to do so.  If the 
record is ultimately determined not to be a public record under the CPRA, 
                                                 
128
 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250 et seq. (2009). 
129
 Id. 
130
 See id. § 6253(a)-(e) for guidelines on the process of accessing records, 
including time limits.  
131
 Id. § 6253(b). 
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other rules may determine whether the official must or may disclose it.  
Officials should also note that the CPRA overlaps with the so-called 
“official information privilege,” which is discussed in section A2 below. In 
many instances, if information is immune to disclosure under the CPRA it 
also falls within the scope of the official information privilege, and need not 
be disclosed. 
 
1. What Constitutes a Public Record? 
 
The CPRA defines a “public record” as “any writing containing 
information relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared, 
owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical 
form or characteristics.”132  A “writing” is:  
 
any handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostatting, 
photographing, photocopying, transmitting by electronic 
mail or facsimile, and every other means of recording upon 
any tangible thing any form of communication or 
representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or 
symbols, or combinations thereof, and any record thereby 
created, regardless of the manner in which the record has 
been stored.133 
  
Officials should note that this definition focuses not on information 
per se, but on a written recording of information.  Therefore, officials 
should not think of the information in the abstract, and in seeking to comply 
with the CPRA, they should not consider whether the content of the record 
in question might be available from some other source outside the agency’s 
purview.  Even if the content is available in some alternative manner, the 
official’s duty is to consider whether the documentation of the information 
within her agency’s database constitutes a public record or not.  
 
The meaning of “writing,” therefore, becomes particularly 
important.  Because the definition is both broad and vague, it is often a 
challenge to determine what constitutes a public record.  Facing this 
challenge, courts must reconcile “two fundamental if somewhat competing 
societal concerns—prevention of secrecy in government and protection of 
individual privacy.”134  Generally, courts are more inclined to find that a 
contested document is a public record, presuming (subject to the 
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 Id. § 6252(e). 
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 Id. § 6252(g). 
134
 Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 651 (Ct. App. 1974). 
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exemptions below) that disclosure is necessary.135  This presumption is even 
stronger with regards to records in the criminal justice system.  Thus, courts 
have required the disclosure of the identities of anyone with a criminal 
conviction working in a child day care facility, the names and employment 
information of peace officers, and the highway patrol’s procedural 
regulations governing the investigation of citizen complaints.136  
 
In cases where courts have held that the documents are not public 
records, there is generally a strong countervailing interest, such as the right 
to privacy.  In Oziel v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1284 (1990), the 
court held that a videotape of a warrant-based search of a psychotherapist’s 
home and office was not a public record, primarily because disclosure 
violated the psychotherapist’s right to privacy and right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. 
Technically speaking, these privacy rights are not “exemptions” under the 
CPRA itself.  Rather, they have been construed as “superior” doctrines that 
preempt application of the CPRA, and its presumption for disclosure.137 
 
The right to privacy, however, can be waived.  In Register Division 
of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, 158 Cal. App. 3d 893 
(1984), a court required disclosure of an inmate’s medical records after the 
inmate reached a secret settlement in a lawsuit with the county.  The court 
emphasized that by voluntarily submitting his medical records in order to 
reach a settlement, the inmate waived any expectation of privacy regarding 
those records.  
 
Similarly, a strong “private function” may militate in favor of 
finding that the contested documents are not public records.  A “private 
function” generally means that the documents do not relate to the “public’s 
business,” or are related to an activity that is “adversarial to and 
independent of the state.”138  In Coronado Police Officers Association v. 
                                                 
135
 See Vallejos v. California Highway Patrol, 89 Cal. App. 3d 781, 784 (Ct. 
App. 1979) (“[T]he general policy of the PRA favors disclosure”). 
136
 Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court, 42 
Cal. 4th 278 (2007); CBS Broad., Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Ct. 
App. 2001); Cook v. Craig, 55 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Ct. App. 1976). 
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 Note that the application of the state right to privacy or the Fourth 
Amendment that removes the information from required CPRA disclosure does not 
necessarily indicate whether the official is forbidden from disseminating the 
information or if they will face liability for disclosure under state or federal law. 
138
 Coronado Police Officers Ass’n v. Carroll, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1006, 
1007 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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Carroll, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1001 (2003), the court held that a database 
compiled and maintained by the public defender’s Office was not a public 
record because “its core function—the provision of adequate representation 
to indigent criminal defendants—was a private function rather than a public 
function.”139 The court likened the actions of the public defender’s office to 
the traditional functions of private defense counsel.140  
 
2. Examples of Public Records 
 
California courts have held that the following documents are public 
records.  As noted where relevant, these documents are not exempted by the 
CPRA—discussed in more detail below: 
 
a. Convictions Relating to Childcare Work 
 
  The Department of Social Services (DSS) must disclose the identity 
of every individual who receives an exemption from a prior criminal 
conviction to work in a licensed child day care facility.  DSS must also 
disclose the identity of each facility employing such individuals.  The 
public has “an overwhelming interest” in making sure that DSS does not 
abuse its discretion in granting these exemptions.141  In comparison to the 
public interest in disclosure, an individual’s privacy interests are low, both 
because past convictions are a matter of public record, and because the 
individual invited public scrutiny when she applied for exemption.  DSS 
disclosure, it should be noted, does not include a birth date or a physical 
description of the individual granted an exemption.142  
 
b. Peace Officers’ Names and Employment Information 
 
The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and 
Training must disclose the names and current employment information of 
all California peace officers.  Such disclosure is permissible because the 
peace officers’ names, employing agencies, and employment dates are not 
                                                 
139
 Id. at 1006 (Contrast this with the holding in County of Santa Clara v. 
Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374 (Ct. App. 2009), in which the county did not 
even contest whether a basemap it had compiled to provide extensive information 
about property parcels was a public record). 
140
 Coronado Police Officers Ass’n, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 1008. 
141
 CBS Broad., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th at 906. 
142
 Id. at 908.  The court added that the $43,000 expense to the government 
involved in compiling such a list was not so great as to militate against disclosure. 
Id. at 909. 
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confidential under the umbrella of “peace officer personnel records,” which 
are otherwise protected by statute.  Peace officer “employment histories,” 
moreover, are only protected with regard to previous employment, not 
current employment status.143 
  
c. Highway Patrol Procedural Regulations Governing Citizen Complaints 
 
The California Highway Patrol (CHP) is required to disclose its 
procedural regulations governing the investigation of citizen complaints 
against CHP personnel.144  
 
d. Traffic Accident Reports 
 
The California Highway Patrol is required to release written traffic 
accident reports prepared and retained by the agency.145  
 
e. Records of Settlements of Tort Claims Brought by County Jail Inmates 
 
Each county is required to release documents related to settlements 
of tort claims brought by county jail inmates.  These documents include: (1) 
the inmate’s medical records; (2) the sheriff's investigation report; (3) the 
minutes from the settlement committee meeting, including deliberation of 
the claim; (4) any rough undated notes made by risk management staff; and 
(5) any remaining settlement records.146  
 
3. Examples of Non-Public Records 
 
California courts have determined that the following documents are 
not public records:  
 
a. Public Defender’s Office Database 
 
A county Public Defender office is not required to provide access to 
a database it compiles and maintains. The database is not a public record 
because “its core function—the provision of adequate representation to 
                                                 
143
 Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court, 42 
Cal. 4th 278 (2007). 
144
 Cook v. Craig, 55 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Ct. App. 1976).  
145
 Vallejos v. California Highway Patrol, 89 Cal. App. 3d 781, 783 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
146
 Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, 158 Cal. 
App. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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indigent criminal defendants—is a private function rather than a public 
function.”  Even if the database were a public record, it would be exempt 
from disclosure under the “catch-all” exemption of the CPRA (§ 6255), 
discussed in detail below.  The public interest in nondisclosure, in fact, 
outweighs any public interest in disclosure: the information contained in 
such a database is necessary to the Public Defender’s function as counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants.147  
 
b. Videotapes of Warrant Searches 
 
The videotape of a warrant-based search of a home and office is not 
a public record, and disclosure may violate the privacy rights of the subject 
of the search.148 
 
4. Statutory Exemptions from CPRA Disclosure Requirements 
 
There are two sections of the CPRA that allow government agencies 
to refuse to disclose certain public records: §§ 6254 and 6255.  Section 
6254 lists dozens of highly specific exemptions for items such as 
preliminary drafts or personnel files. (Agencies should consult the statute 
for additional exemptions not discussed in Subpart 1, below.)  Section 6255 
provides a “catch-all” exemption to disclosure when “the public interest 
served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest 
served by disclosure of the record.”  The party opposing disclosure under 
the CPRA bears the burden of proving that an exemption applies.   
 
Consequently, an agency can avoid disclosure by (1) arguing that a 
document is not a public record under the general definitions discussed 
above; (2) resisting disclosure by relying on a specific exemption found in § 
6254; or (3) asserting that a document falls within the “catch-all” exemption 
provision of § 6255.  Considerable overlap exists among these three 
grounds, and agencies often invoke more than one. 
 
a. Specific Exemptions under CPRA Section 6254 
 
Section 6254 includes a number of specially enumerated exemptions 
to disclosure obligations. Only those provisions relevant to criminal justice 
administration are addressed in this section.  In some instances, section 
6254 simply notes whole categories of information that are exempted from 
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disclosure, even if that information otherwise meets the general definition 
of public records discussed above.  In other instances, section 6254 
recognizes that certain forms of information are public records, and 
presumptively must be disclosed, but will nevertheless exempt a 
subcategory of that information.  Illustrative examples of the information 
affected by CPRA section 6254 includes the following: 
 
● Agencies do not have to release the following: most preliminary 
drafts, notes, or memoranda;149 records pertaining to pending litigation 
when the public agency is a party;150 and personnel or medical files.151  
 
● The Attorney General, the Department of Justice, any state or local 
police agency, and any other state or local agency acting for correctional or 
law enforcement purposes do not have to disclose records of complaints 
they have received or records of investigations they have conducted. 
 
● Although agencies “shall disclose the names and addresses of 
persons involved in, or witnesses other than confidential informants to, the 
incident,” as well as the statements of parties involved in the incident 
(except the statements of confidential informants), they do not have to 
disclose information that “would endanger the safety of a witness or other 
person involved in the investigation,” or information that “would endanger 
the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation.”  
Agencies can also refuse to disclose any “portion of those investigative files 
that reflects the analysis or conclusions of the investigating officer.”152  
 
● There is a presumption that State and local law enforcement 
agencies must provide public access to information about individuals who 
are arrested.  Law enforcement agencies, however, are exempt from such 
disclosure if it “would endanger the safety of a person involved in an 
investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the 
investigation or a related investigation.” If this exception does not apply, 
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agencies should publicly disclose: 
 
The full name and occupation of every individual 
arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical 
description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair, 
sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the 
time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the 
factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount 
of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location 
where the individual is currently being held, and all 
charges the individual is being held upon, including any 
outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole 
or probation holds.153 
 
● Agencies are not required to release “criminal offender 
record information” (i.e., prior arrest records).154  
 
● Criminal justice agencies must disclose the “time, substance, and 
location of all complaints or requests for assistance received by the agency” 
and “the time and nature of the response.” Specifically, agencies must 
disclose “the time, date, and location of the occurrence, the time and date of 
the report, the name and age of the victim, the factual circumstances 
surrounding the crime or incident, and a general description of any injuries, 
property, or weapons involved.”155  As discussed above, the Victims’ Bill of 
Rights (VBR) has superseded this provision and prohibits the disclosure of 
a victim’s name and identifying information absent consent.  (Note that 
courts have yet to interpret the VBR, so there is great uncertainty about the 
reach of its provisions. Until courts provide additional guidance about how 
to implement the VBR, agencies should not release victim information as 
discussed in Part IV.)  
 
b. CPRA Section 6255: The “Catch-all” Balancing Test Exemption 
 
Beyond the enumerated exemptions in Section 6254, the California 
Public Records Act provides a “catch-all” exemption for records meeting a 
general exemption standard—where “the public interest served by not 
disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by 
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disclosure of the record.”156  The burden of proof falls on the government 
agency seeking to invoke this exemption and prevent disclosure.157  
Disclosure is strongly favored, and the agency must “demonstrate a clear 
overbalance on the side of confidentiality.”158  The inquiry is heavily case- 
and fact-specific. 
 
  A 2009 California appellate decision ordering Santa Clara County 
to fulfill a CPRA request for geographic information system (GIS) mapping 
data sheds some light on the balancing test courts use when assessing the 
“catch-all” exemption.159  The county argued that public finances (the 
mapping data was valuable) and security concerns weighed against 
disclosure. The court disagreed, finding that the public interest in disclosure 
was “neither hypothetical nor minimal,”160 as measured by “whether 
disclosure would contribute significantly to public understanding of 
government activities.”161  The court, moreover, thought the case could be 
differentiated from situations involving individual privacy concerns, as well 
as situations where “less intrusive means to obtain the information” 
existed.162  
 
  In assessing the public interest against disclosure, the court found 
little evidence that the government’s financial concerns were legitimate, and 
noted that the CPRA did not “suggest that a records request must impose no 
burden on the government agency.”163 Addressing the security concerns, the 
court noted that the county had sold the data to other entities, and found that 
the GIS did not primarily contain information with national-security 
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implications.164 The CPRA’s exemptions, the court held, cannot be applied 
to classify information that would otherwise be public.165  Although security 
concerns could weigh heavily against disclosure, the “mere assertion of 
possible endangerment does not ‘clearly outweigh’ the public interest in 
access to these public records.”166   
 
  The “catch-all” exemption, nevertheless, has been used to prevent 
disclosure of records in cases where an individual’s right to privacy is at 
issue.  For instance, a prisoner’s records, sought by the media, are not 
considered public records subject to disclosure.  In reaching this decision, a 
California court cited the prisoner’s right to a trial free of unfair 
prejudice.167  
 
5. Legal Remedies for Invalid Non-Disclosure under the CPRA 
 
Because the purpose of the CPRA is to ensure access to non-exempt 
public records, the statute’s remedies are intended to confront wrongful 
nondisclosure.  These remedies are limited to injunctions or declarative 
relief,168 and the award of attorney’s fees in litigation if the plaintiff 
prevails.169  Individual public officials, consequently, should not fear that 
they will be personally liable for damages if they erroneously refuse to 
disclose information that is ultimately determined to be a non-exempt 
public record.   
 
Agencies, however, do have an affirmative burden to assist records 
requesters: they must “assist the member of the public to identify records 
and information that are responsive to the request or to the purpose of the 
request” and “provide suggestions for overcoming any practical basis for 
denying access to the records or information sought.”170 The provision sets 
forth a “reasonable effort” standard and does not apply if the public agency 
denies the request under one of the specific exemptions of CPRA § 6254 or 
if the agency makes available an index of its records.171 
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 Agencies should carefully consider what portions of their records 
are likely to be exempted under § 6254’s specific provisions before relying 
on the “catch-all” exemption to protect data.  Because a heavy burden falls 
on the government in “catch-all”-exemption litigation, such cases may be 
time-consuming, costly, and difficult to win. Moreover, because cost is not 
a justification for withholding data under the CPRA, and because the CPRA 
places affirmative obligations on agencies to assist record-seekers in their 
searches, agencies designing databases should consider technologies that 
will reduce the burden on employees in dealing with public-records 
requests. 
 
B.  Federal Statutes: FOIA, the Privacy Act, and the Information Practices 
Act 
 
This section describes federal statutes that govern when information 
must be released (and by whom).  FOIA and the Privacy Act apply to 
records held by the federal government—but it is included in this Primer 
because federal agencies often exchange information with local agencies.  
The Information Practices Act imposes limitations on exposing nonpublic 
information to the public, but the relief is primarily injunctive.  Each shall 
be discussed in turn. 
 
1. FOIA and the Privacy Act 
 
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)172 and the Privacy Act173 
allow public access to records held by the federal government.  The statutes 
are worth noting in this Primer because federal officials, whether or not they 
are located in California, may interact with state officials on some criminal 
justice matters.  Nevertheless, these federal statutes have no direct 
application to state officials. 
 
Like the CPRA, the FOIA provides an exemption for “records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes.”174  However, FOIA’s 
exemption for investigatory data is much harder to claim: FOIA requires 
proof that investigatory information “would interfere with enforcement, 
threaten a fair trial, invade a person’s privacy, disclose confidential 
information or sources, disclose investigative techniques, or endanger the 
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life of law enforcement personnel.”175  California state officials, 
consequently, have more discretion to avoid disclosure under the state law 
than federal officials do under the federal law. 
 
  Distinct from FOIA, the federal Privacy Act allows individuals to 
access their own federal records and to request that the record be changed if 
inaccurate.176  It also places affirmative requirements on federal databases 
to contain accurate and timely information.177 (These requirements do not 
apply to non-federal actors, unless the inability to petition for changes to 
inaccurate data rises to the level of a constitutional-rights violation.)  The 
head of a federal agency may exempt that agency from many Privacy Act 
requirements, including those pertaining to accuracy, if the agency’s 
database “performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the 
enforcement of criminal laws.”178  The U.S. Department of Justice, for 
instance, chose in 2003 to exempt certain databases from accuracy 
requirements, including the National Crime Information Center.179  In 
exempting the databases, the federal DOJ said that the “exemption is 
necessary to avoid interference with law enforcement functions and 
responsibilities of the FBI . . . because in the collection of information for 
law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what 
information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete.”180 
 
 Remedies under the Privacy Act, in cases where records have not been 
exempted, include injunctions or orders to amend the record and awards of 
attorney fees and costs if the plaintiff “substantially” prevails; if the agency 
acted intentionally or willfully, actual damages will also be awarded.181  
Damages are often limited, however, because of the requirement that they 
be actual, provable damages.  For instance, the Supreme Court overturned 
an award for disclosure of a plaintiff’s social security number because the 
plaintiff could not prove the disclosure resulted in actual damages.182 
Criminal penalties are also available against federal agency employees who 
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willfully and wrongfully disclose data.183 
 
2. The Information Practices Act 
 
The Information Practices Act (IPA) “generally imposes limitations 
on the right of governmental agencies to disclose personal information 
about an individual.”184  Except for specifically enumerated exceptions, 
“[n]o agency may disclose any personal information in a manner that would 
link the information disclosed to the individual to whom it pertains.”185  The 
IPA, therefore, operates as a specific statutory version of the right to 
privacy. Violations may result in an injunction;186 damages are only 
applicable when someone “other than an employee of the state or of a local 
government agency acting solely in his or her official capacity” discloses 
nonpublic information knowing it was maintained by a government 
agency.187 
 
 The IPA is unlikely to create many difficulties for information-
sharing efforts.  First, the IPA permits disclosure for a legitimate purpose 
and balances “the intrusion [on privacy] against the public interests to be 
served.”188  The handful of cases brought under the IPA concern agencies or 
individuals who disclosed information for no legitimate agency purpose.189   
 
Second, and most important, the IPA specifically permits intra- and 
inter-agency disclosure.  The IPA permits intra-agency disclosure “[t]o 
those officers, employees, attorneys, agents, or volunteers of the agency that 
has custody of the information,” insofar as the disclosure is relevant and 
necessary for official duties and is related to the purpose for which it was 
acquired.190  It also permits inter-agency disclosure to a person or other 
agency when it is needed for the transferee to “perform its constitutional or 
statutory duties” and the use is compatible with the purpose for which it was 
collected.  The statute simply requires that the transferring agency maintain 
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a record of disclosure that includes the date, nature of the disclosed 
information, and purpose of the disclosure, as well as the name, title, and 
business address of the person or agency to which the disclosure was 
made.191  
 
These permitted disclosures are exceptionally broad. They apply 
where receipt of the information is relevant to the agency or sub-agency’s 
function and therefore would clearly apply whenever a criminal justice 
agency wishes to share information with another governmental agency for 
purposes relevant to criminal justice. 
 
VI. LITIGATION ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 
 
This Part deals with issues that might come up during the 
prosecution of defendants in criminal cases.  There are three examples that 
are considered, in sections A, B, and C respectively.  The first concerns 
whether reliance on inaccurate data in the issuance or execution of search 
warrants might result in suppression of evidence.  The second, in section B, 
concerns the prosecution’s obligation under Brady to turn over exculpatory 
evidence.  Information sharing widens the pool of information which might 
potentially exculpate defendants, and thus creates challenges for Brady 
compliance.  The third, in section C, concerns evidentiary privilege rules—
the complex rules concerning when an individual (or an entity) may not 
disclose private information.  Each will be discussed in turn. 
  
A.  Reliance on Inaccurate Data and Evidentiary Exclusion 
 
 The subject of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, 
and the requirement of probable cause for arrest, comprises a vast body of 
legal doctrine—far beyond the scope of this Primer.   Nevertheless, one 
issue related to searches and seizures is a very salient one for agency 
officials and employees--most obviously those in law enforcement and the 
judiciary--dealing with individualized data.  This is the issue of the 
consequences of officials’ reliance on inaccurate data when executing an 
arrest or a carrying out a search.   The issue arises especially when police 
act under the authority of a warrant.   A warrant is actually not required for 
the majority of arrests and for some cases of searches, but warrants play an 
important role in cases of “teamwork,” where some officials do not possess 
the original source of information, but instead are “downstream” receivers 
of information ultimately certified in a warrant. 
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The bottom line is clear: police, prosecutors, and judicial officials 
probably need not even fear loss of admissible evidence when their actions 
rest on inaccurate data.  They must, however, have a good faith, 
“objectively reasonable basis” for their belief in the accuracy of that data.   
  
Reliance on inaccurate data can threaten the legality of police 
conduct under the Fourth Amendment.  Arrests and searches normally must 
be based on an inference from available facts that there is probable cause to 
believe the person has committed a crime, or, in the case of a search, that 
evidence of the crime is present in the place to be searched.  Therefore, if 
the police have drawn the inference of probable cause from false data, 
probable cause may not exist.   
 
Most of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law bears on 
one major consequence of a violation of Fourth Amendment rights—
suppression of evidence in a criminal proceeding, under the exclusionary 
rule.    
 
But the retrospective determination that the inference of probable 
cause rested on mistaken information will not necessarily render the 
evidence subject to the exclusionary rule.   The Supreme Court confirmed 
the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule in United States v. 
Leon.192  There, a magistrate negligently issued a warrant on the basis of an 
affidavit that, in retrospect, was deemed insufficient to support probable 
cause.  The Court held that the evidence seized under the warrant need not 
be suppressed because the police reasonably relied on the magistrate’s 
judgment.193   In 1995, the Court extended this doctrine in Arizona v. Evans, 
to a case where the error was not the probable cause for the warrant but the 
very existence of a warrant: the police had relied on a judicial database that 
had failed to record the expiration of an old warrant.194   
 
But the application of this doctrine to errors by law enforcement 
itself was just recently resolved by the Supreme Court in Herring v. United 
States.195  Herring involved an erroneous record of an expired warrant, but 
the error was by the police agency itself.   The Court held that if an officer 
reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant on an individual, 
but that belief turns out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping 
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error by another police employee, evidence found during the subsequent 
search-incident-to-arrest need not be suppressed.196  As the Court noted, the 
rationale underlying the exclusionary rule is that exclusion rule is a 
prophylactic remedy intended to deter misconduct. The exclusionary rule is 
not an individual right: It applies only where the “benefits of deterrence . . . 
outweigh the costs.”197  The Court determined in Herring that the costs of 
applying the exclusionary rule to negligent errors outweigh the benefits, 
since the negligent conduct is not “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
meaningfully deter it.”198 
 
If, however, police mistakes are the result of “systemic error or 
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,” resulting evidence may, 
in fact, be excluded.199   Thus, to avoid suppression of evidence, police 
departments should establish reliable databases and consistent 
recordkeeping methods to avoid a finding of systemic error or recklessness 
in maintaining a warrant system. Moreover, if any employee of the police 
department “knowingly [makes] false entries to lay the groundwork for 
future false arrests,” a court would surely exclude the evidence.200  
 
Evidence gained in reliance on inaccurate information from judicial 
employees is even less likely to be excluded.  First, when police rely on 
mistaken information in a court’s database that an arrest warrant is 
outstanding, evidence resulting from the subsequent search-incident-to-
arrest is not subject to exclusion.201 Thus, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply when a judicial employee makes a negligent error.  In Arizona v. 
Evans, the Court reasoned that (1) the exclusionary rule was historically 
designed to deter police misconduct, not errors by clerks, judges or 
magistrates; (2) there was no evidence that judicial employees were inclined 
to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and (3) there was no basis for believing 
that suppressing the evidence would have a significant deterrent effect on 
judicial employees.202  
  
B.  The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Under Brady 
 
Every lawyer should know the constitutional rule established in 
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Brady v. Maryland, requiring prosecutors to turn over relevant 
“exculpatory” information to a defendant.  Exculpatory information weighs 
in favor of the defendant’s innocence.203  Every California prosecutor, 
similarly, should know she is subject to additional state rules and policies 
governing discovery in criminal litigation.  In effect, these discovery laws 
constitute a special subcategory of “information sharing” rules, and they 
merit discussion in this Primer.   
 
New developments in electronic databases and information-sharing 
in and among public agencies have complicated criminal discovery rules.  
The developments also require prosecutors to consider the Brady doctrine in 
coordination with the other rules governing criminal justice data sharing 
discussed in this Primer.  Prosecutors who are mindful of their obligations 
to disclose exculpatory information to defendants may have augmented 
responsibilities if they partake in an integrated criminal justice information 
system. Put differently, Brady-type rules must be placed in a holistic picture 
of the criminal justice system. 
 
1. The Duty to Disclose 
   
The prosecutor’s core responsibilities do not change in an electronic 
data-sharing environment.  Whenever criminal justice agencies enter into 
data-sharing agreements that include prosecutors—and thereby integrate 
themselves into what courts have termed the “prosecution team” (agencies 
that aid the prosecutor in performing a prosecutorial function)—the 
participating prosecutors are responsible for disclosing any material 
exculpatory information to the defendant that the integrated agencies 
possess, even if these agencies do not call the exculpatory information to 
the prosecutor’s attention. Consequently, a prosecutor that is concerned 
with minimizing his or her liability for not disclosing exculpatory 
information will be reluctant to participate in an integrated criminal justice 
information system.  
 
At least three layers of rules mandate the prosecutor’s duty to 
disclose: 
 
a. Federal Due Process Requirements 
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 In general, defendants do not have a constitutional right to discovery 
in criminal proceedings.204  In Brady v. Maryland, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that defendants have a due process right to 
discover “exculpatory evidence” in a criminal case.205  It is a violation of a 
defendant’s due process rights for a prosecutor to suppress exculpatory 
evidence, regardless of whether the suppression is intentional or 
inadvertent.  In post-Brady cases, the Court has construed the term 
“exculpatory” to cover a wide variety of information, including all 
information that has a minimally plausible potential to aid the defense in 
creating reasonable doubt of guilt.206  Even evidence that favors the 
prosecutor may be “exculpatory” if timely awareness of it would help the 
defense prepare to rebut it or to impeach the state’s witnesses. 207   Although 
the Brady doctrine does not set down strict timing rules, prosecutors must 
provide exculpatory evidence in time to give the accused a reasonable 
opportunity to benefit from it at trial, and prosecutors are well-advised to 
continue to disclose any such exculpatory evidence even during plea 
bargain negotiations and after trial, pending appeal.208 
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The Court has also held that the prosecutor has an affirmative duty 
to look for exculpatory evidence held by various partner law enforcement 
agencies, including the police.209  The prosecutor must disclose the 
exculpatory evidence to the defendant regardless of whether the defendant 
made a specific discovery request for exculpatory material evidence.210  
Finally, and most importantly for integrated criminal justice information 
systems, the Supreme Court has held that “the individual prosecutor has a 
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”211   
 
The Brady doctrine does not by itself impose any personal liability 
on government officials for failing to comply with their discovery duties. 
The constitutionally prescribed remedy, however indirect, is still powerful.  
If, on appeal after conviction, the defendant can establish a failure to turn 
over material exculpatory evidence, the appellate court must reverse the 
conviction if there is any reasonable probability that the withheld 
information would have affected the verdict—i.e., if there is any reasonable 
probability that the jury (or judge, in a bench trial), informed by the 
evidence in question, would have acquitted on any count of conviction.  
This retrospective conception of the Brady rule might, in marginal cases, 
make it hard for prosecutors to comply.  In effect, the very definition of 
what makes evidence material and exculpatory depends on this 
retrospective view, yet as the state’s case evolves during trial itself, it may 
be difficult to predict whether evidence would affect the ultimate verdict. 
Nevertheless, the professional ethics codes and California state laws 
counsel that prosecutors err well on the side of timely disclosure before or 
during trial to avoid sanctions and possible reversal.  
 
b. American Bar Association and California Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 
 
 Under the American Bar Association and California Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, a prosecutor must provide the defense with 
exculpatory evidence during trial and mitigating evidence during 
sentencing.212  A prosecutor is prohibited from suppressing any evidence 
                                                                                                                            
obligations under state law; see Subparts 1 and 3 of this Part. 
209Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
210United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
211
 Kyles, 514 U.S. at  437. 
212
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8(d) (2002). 
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that he or she is legally obligated to disclose to the defense.213  A failure to 
disclose exculpatory information may constitute a violation of the 
California Rules of Professional Conduct214 and other ethical standards,215 
and therefore lead to professional disciplinary sanctions. 
 
 
c. California Statutory Requirements 
 
 In California, the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence 
mirrors the prosecutor’s obligations under Brady.216  Similar to Brady, 
Penal Code Section 1054.1(e) acts as a foundation that establishes the 
prosecutor’s basic discovery obligations.  Various California courts have 
issued opinions to demarcate a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under 
Penal Code Sections 1054 et seq.  In general, the statutory requirements do 
not impose a greater duty on the prosecutor to disclose favorable evidence 
to the defense.217 In re Littlefield, for example, holds that the prosecution 
must disclose exculpatory information when it is reasonably accessible to 
the prosecution and not accessible to the defense.218  In addition, Izazaga v. 
Superior Court, reaffirming the holding in United States v. Agurs, explained 
that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence regardless of 
whether a discovery request is made by the defendant.219  
 
 California courts have also noted that “the duty of the prosecuting 
                                                 
213
 CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 5-220 (1992).  
214See id. (Rule 5-220 Suppression of Evidence describes that “[a] member 
shall not suppress any evidence that the member or the member's client has a legal 
obligation to reveal or to produce”). 
215
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE: A LAWYER’S 
RESPONSIBILITIES (2002); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS, 
PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION, STANDARD 3-3.1 (1992); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, R. 8.4(A) (2002). 
216
 5 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW CRIM TRIAL § 41 (2008); see also id. § 550; 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(E) (2008); 3-70 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
PRACTICE § 70.03 (2008) (“Penal Code Section 1054.1(e) requires the prosecution 
to disclose to the defense ‘any exculpatory evidence.’ This requirement does not 
supersede or limit the prosecution’s duty under the Federal Constitution to disclose 
all substantial material evidence favorable to the accused.”). 
217
 See, e.g., People v. Zambrano, 41 Cal. 4th 1082, 1133-1134 (2007), 
overruled, in part, by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390, 421 (2009). 
218
 See, e.g., In re Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th 122 (1993); People v. Coyer, 142 Cal. 
App. 3d 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1983). See generally 5 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW CRIM 
TRIAL § 70 (2008).  
219
 Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356 (1991). 
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attorney to disclose exculpatory evidence does not end when the trial is 
over.”220 A prosecutor’s obligations to disclose material exculpatory 
information spans the entire life of a criminal case. Finally, state courts 
have clarified that a prosecutor is deemed to possess exculpatory evidence if 
the information is actually held by an agency that has assisted the criminal 
prosecution or investigation.  The major consideration in this regard is 
whether the agency has been “acting on the government’s behalf.”221 
 
2. The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Information When She 
Has Access to Integrated Criminal Justice Information Systems  
 
Wider access to criminal justice information can change the scope of the 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory information.  It can do so by 
increasing the amount of information to be reviewed, leading to concerns 
over how prosecutors are to be guided in what to disclose and how and 
when to disclose it.  Second, a tightly-integrated criminal justice 
information system might expand the definition of the prosecution team 
itself to include law enforcement.  This might mean that, say, a local police 
department might be unaware it has Brady obligations and fail to turn over 
evidence.  After discussing these two concerns, this section goes on to 
consider possible responses to them and to discuss how information 
exchange might make Brady compliance more efficient.  
 
                                                 
220
 See CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 11.31 (Cal 
CEB 2008); 5 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW CRIM TRIAL § 34 (2008) (discussing 
proceedings covered under the provisions of Penal Code 1054 et seq.); 5 WITKIN 
CAL. CRIM. LAW CRIM TRIAL § 78 (2008) (citing People v. Garcia, 17 Cal. 4th 
1169, 1179 (1993)). 
221
 People v. Superior Court (Barrett), 80 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1315 (Ct. App. 
2000) (“The scope of the prosecutorial duty to disclose encompasses exculpatory 
evidence possessed by investigative agencies to which the prosecutor has 
reasonable access. A prosecutor has a duty to search for and disclose exculpatory 
evidence if the evidence is possessed by a person or agency that has been used by 
the prosecutor or investigating agency to assist the prosecution or the investigation 
agency in its work. The important determination is whether the person or agency 
has been ‘acting on the government’s behalf.’ Conversely, a prosecutor does not 
have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence or information to a defendant unless 
the prosecution team actually or constructively possesses the evidence or 
information. Thus, information possessed by an agency that has no connection to 
the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge against the defendant is not 
possessed by the prosecution team, and the prosecutor does not have the duty to 
search for or to disclose such material.”).   
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a. The scope of “exculpatory” or “material” information 
 
 In the absence of a prosecutor’s willful decision to suppress obvious, 
readily accessible exculpatory information, most Brady material is neither 
easily identifiable nor readily attainable. Even where electronic data-sharing 
makes information more accessible, the exculpatory content of that 
information remains difficult to discern. In many cases, office guidelines 
instruct federal and state prosecutors how to handle the discovery of Brady 
material, but are not standardized or sufficiently instructive.222 As a result, 
individual prosecutors wield substantial discretion in determining how to 
manage their discovery obligations under Brady and Penal Code Section 
1054.1(e). A prosecutor can withhold evidence if the prosecutor believes 
that there is a reasonable probability that the information will not affect the 
jury verdict, and this requirement does not change simply because the 
formatting of information is electronic. 
 
 This “gamesmanship” problem is most evident in the scenario where 
the defense does not make a specific discovery request for exculpatory 
material. In these situations the prosecutor is given no outside structure 
through which to determine what information would likely assist the 
defense in building an effective defense.  The prosecutor is not required to 
give the defense everything the defense could conceivably wish to 
receive,223 but she may be forced to make difficult judgment calls as to 
whether evidence is helpful or material.  Courts encourage prosecutors to 
disclose information that may be exculpatory—and, in fact, a prosecutor is 
free to share any non-privileged information—but not all prosecutors will 
want to unnecessarily buttress a defense case with information that is 
ultimately just “helpful” to the defense. 
                                                 
222
 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, BRADY LAW AND POLICY: VENTURA COUNTY (July 6, 2007), available 
at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/expert/Ventura%20Brady%2
0outline.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, OFFICIAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20REP
ORT%20ON%20BRADY%20COMPLIANCE.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).  
223
 In re Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th 122, 135 (1993) (“[T]he prosecution has no 
general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial 
to the defense.”). See also In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 569 (1963) (“Although 
representatives of the state may not suppress substantial material evidence, they are 
under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that they learn about the 
case and about their witnesses.”). 
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 The good faith attempt to identify and disclose reasonably accessible 
exculpatory material to the accused—but not to share helpful material—
may be viewed by others as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the 
requirements of Brady and its progeny. What further complicates this 
problem is that it is hard for a prosecutor to identify favorable information 
at the outset of a trial when he or she has no idea how the issues will 
actually play out at trial.  As is often the case with alleged Brady violations, 
evidence that a prosecutor categorizes as non-discoverable before the trial 
may prove to be material evidence at later stages in the case.  
 
 In many instances, consequently, the prosecutor may simply guess 
wrong whether evidence is material, while in other instances the prosecutor 
might arguably be guilty of hedging against certain information getting 
uncovered. Amidst these dilemmas, robust information sharing platforms 
are likely to increase the frequency with which a prosecutor is forced to 
make materiality determinations, as the universe of potentially exculpatory 
information will certainly expand. 
 
b. Expanding the “Prosecution Team” and the Prosecutor’s 
Responsibilities 
  
 In addition to the identification issue, a separate dilemma for 
prosecutors arises in an electronic data-sharing environment when more 
parties are grouped as members of the prosecution team.224  Not only is the 
universe of information likely to be characterized as reasonably accessible, 
but the agencies possessing the information may also be characterized as 
engaging in a prosecutorial function.  Namely, a prosecutor that has 
systematic and formal data sharing access to information compiled by local 
criminal justice agencies is arguably incorporating those agencies into the 
prosecution team, even if they are not instrumental to a prosecutorial or 
investigative function. (Under Brady, information possessed by an agency 
that has no connection to the investigation or prosecution, and is not part of 
an information-sharing agreement, is not possessed by the prosecution team, 
and, thus, the prosecutor does not have a duty to search for or to disclose 
such material.)  
 
 In this regard, a prosecutor’s participation in a comprehensive 
                                                 
224
 Members of the prosecution team include any federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officers and other government officials participating in the 
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the defendant. Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).  
12 Dec. 2010] DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER 57 
information sharing system may unwittingly expand the prosecutor’s 
obligations to account for the information of other agencies now 
incorporated into the prosecution team.225  While the prosecutor’s 
disclosure obligations do not change in a formalized data-sharing 
environment, the universe of readily accessible information for which the 
prosecutor is liable is expanded.226  As a practical matter, the prosecutor 
faces an increased risk of overlooking relevant information and exhibiting 
negligence if she does not micromanage the other agencies. In all 
likelihood, though, a prosecutor will demonstrate competence in seeking out 
exculpatory information that is maintained in an integrated information 
database. 
 
c. An Open File Policy as a Remedy for Gamesmanship? 
  
 Prosecutors are not required to adopt an open file policy,227 but 
prosecutors may increasingly elect to use an open file discovery policy in 
the context of electronic data-sharing. The gamesmanship problem remains 
a concern when a prosecutor adopts an open file policy because the open 
file policy may be employed as a tool to subvert the prosecutor’s duty to 
disclose Brady material.228  While an open file policy, in some sense, may 
enhance the perception of compliance, the underlying concern is that a 
prosecutor is still able to withhold information that is presented in an open 
file.229  
 
 As a practical matter, an open file policy is most useful when the 
information in the file is accurate and complete. Therefore, a prosecutor 
who makes no effort to supplement the information in the file or to ensure 
that the open file is actually representative of the information that they can 
access will distort the discovery process and violate a defendant’s due 
                                                 
225
 The prosecution’s obligations will remain the same with respect to entities 
that are traditionally considered part of the prosecution team even if the latter 
entities do not partake in the information sharing network.  
226
 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 142 Cal. App. 4th 776 (Ct. App. 2006) (police 
reports concerning impeachment evidence not in an electronic database, Criminal 
Justice Information System, that defense counsel had access to and prosecutor did 
not provide defense with missing police reports in violation of Brady). 
227
 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (“We have never held that the Constitution demands 
an open file policy.”).  
228
 See, e.g., People v. Zambrano, 41 Cal. 4th 1082, 1134 (2007) overruled, in 
part, by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390, 421 (2009).   
229
 See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).  
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process rights.230 The prosecutor would not satisfy his Brady discovery 
obligations by simply relying on a participating agency to update a shared 
database; the responsibility to disclose is uniquely the prosecutor’s 
obligation.231 For instance, information that is in the process of being 
uploaded into a database is still subject to the Brady rules.232   
 
 As a result, an open file policy does not necessarily obviate a 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory materials not contained in the 
open file; but an open file policy can effectively lessen the suspicion that a 
prosecutor is withholding information. Perceptions of compliance aside, if a 
prosecutor is responsible for disclosing exculpatory information held by 
integrated agencies, it may be most practical for the prosecutor to provide 
the defendant with access to the entire file. Some commentators express 
concern that an open file policy may be used as a tactic to overwhelm the 
defense with information.233  In the context of an electronic database, 
however, it may be quite easy for a defense counsel to key word search 
through the electronic file. In this sense, an integrated database of 
information may facilitate the discovery of Brady material. 
 
                                                 
230
 This problem is compounded by the fact that a defendant is unlikely to 
know whether a file is complete and may actually gain a false confidence from 
having access to the prosecutor’s open file regarding how to proceed at trial. In 
effect, the defendant is in the same position as when the prosecutor informs the 
defense that there is no exculpatory evidence. The defense has no real way to 
measure how forthright the prosecutor is in representing compliance with the 
discovery rules. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Bagley, this type of 
misrepresentation can cause detrimental reliance on the part of the defense, e.g., 
“the defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial 
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667, 682 (1985).   
231
 See e.g., In re Brown, 17 Cal. 4th 873 (1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
unambiguously assigned the duty to disclose solely and exclusively to the 
prosecution; those assisting the government’s case are no more than agents. By 
necessary implication, the duty is nondelegable at least to the extent the 
prosecution remains responsible for any lapse in compliance. Since the prosecution 
must bear the consequences of its own failure to disclose, a fortiori, it must be 
charged with any negligence on the part of other agencies acting on its behalf.”).   
232
 Id. at 881 (“The principles Brady and its progeny embody are not 
abstractions or matters of technical compliance. The sole purpose is to ensure that 
the defendant has all available exculpatory evidence to mount a defense. To that 
end, a document sent but not received is as useless as a document not sent at all.”).   
233Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors 
Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531 (2007). 
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 Given the likelihood that criminal justice agency files are not always 
in synch with a prosecutor’s file (for instance, due to delays in uploading 
information), an open file policy in an integrated information database may 
provide a defendant with wholly accurate and reliable information at one 
point but incomplete and misrepresentative information at another. A 
defense attorney will likely be aware of this pitfall, as discussed earlier, but 
it is not the defense attorney’s responsibility to micromanage a prosecutor’s 
discovery obligations. 
 
d. Improved Efficiency and Quality of Information 
 
 Although an integrated information system may make some of the 
gamesmanship problems more pronounced, an integrated information 
system could also enable the prosecutor to more efficiently meet his or her 
Brady disclosure requirements.234 Assuming a prosecutor seeks a fair 
adjudicative process and demonstrates a willingness to act in good faith, an 
electronic data-sharing environment can facilitate prompt compliance with 
Brady and comparable discovery rules. The vast amount of information that 
a prosecutor is obligated to sift through would become more easily 
navigable if aligned criminal justice agencies (i.e., agencies that would 
normally be considered part of the prosecution team) participate in 
integrated criminal justice information sharing systems.   
 
 The effectiveness of discovery rules established by Brady and under 
Penal Code Sections 1054 et seq. ultimately depends on the individual 
attitudes and posture of a prosecutor. It may seem counterintuitive that a 
prosecutor can more effectively manage information when there is more 
information available, but the core issue is whether or not the prosecutor is 
aware of the information, and an integrated criminal justice information 
system can strengthen this awareness.  It will be less convincing, 
consequently, for a prosecutor to claim that she was ignorant of exculpatory 
information within an integrated information sharing system. Hence, a 
prosecutor may end up being more dutiful—and accountable—as 
information-sharing increases.  
 
                                                 
234
 In Kyles v. Whitley, Justice Souter captures this idea in discussing some of 
the practical problems a prosecutor may face in meeting his or her Brady 
obligations: “In the State’s favor it may be said that no one doubts that police 
investigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they know. But neither is 
there any serious doubt that ‘procedures and regulations can be established to carry 
[the prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all relevant information 
on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.’”  514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).   
60 DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER [12 Dec. 2010] 
C.  Evidentiary Privileges 
 
Many people are roughly familiar with traditional privilege rules, 
such as the attorney-client privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
and the privilege between clergy and their parishioners.  Privilege laws are 
generally designed to protect information from disclosure in litigation or 
other formal legal proceedings.  Privilege, therefore, differs from 
“confidentiality” laws that require (or permit) agencies to withhold certain 
information from disclosure regardless of whether any formal proceeding is 
involved.  Most commonly, privilege laws allow an individual to refuse to 
testify, or to refuse to answer certain questions when under subpoena in a 
court, regulatory proceeding, legislative hearing, or grand jury. 
 
The majority of conventional privilege laws will not affect 
information-sharing among criminal justice agencies for one reason: The 
most common effect of these privilege laws is to enable private parties to 
withhold information from the government (or other private parties).  The 
common privilege laws may prevent the government from getting certain 
information in the first instance, but they rarely affect the ability of agencies 
to use or share that information when it has been legally obtained.  On the 
other hand, there are some rules that fall into the category of privileges—
especially official business privileges—that require discussion in this 
Primer.  In any event, a brief review of the overall nature and operation of 
privilege laws supplies helpful context for information sharing 
responsibilities. 
 
1. Evidentiary Privileges 
 
 Most of the relevant privilege laws appear in the Evidence Code and 
apply to both civil and criminal cases.  Penal Code sections 1054.6 and 
1102 are also relevant to criminal cases.   Under Penal Code Section 
1054.6: 
 
Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is 
required to disclose any materials or information which are 
“work product,” as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 
2018 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or which are privileged 
pursuant to an express statutory provision, or are privileged 
as provided by the Constitution of the United States. 
 
And Penal Code 1102 states that “the rules of evidence in civil actions 
are applicable also to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this 
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code.”235  
 
The result is that the Evidence Code’s privilege rules generally 
apply in criminal cases just as they do in civil cases.236  These main 
privileges are: 
 
(1) self-incrimination237; (2) marital communications238; 
(3) attorney-client239; (4) clergyman-penitent240; (5) 
psychotherapist-patient241; (6) sexual assault counselor-
victim242; (7) official information243; (8) newsperson’s 
privilege244; (9) identity of informer245; (10) domestic 
violence counselor-victim246; and (11) attorney work 
product.247   
 
Putting aside the unique nature of the privilege against self-
incrimination (rooted in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution), these are 
typically “communications” privileges designed to protect personal 
relationships or other interests where the protection of confidentiality 
outweighs the need for evidence.  Privileged information, as a consequence, 
is formally defined as “a confidential communication between properly 
related parties and incident to the relation.”248  
                                                 
235
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1102 (2008). See also 4 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW 
CRIM PROC § 4.2 (2008).  
236The one key anomaly is that the broad physician-patient privilege applies 
solely in civil cases, although  psychotherapist-patient privilege (covering 
physicians serving as therapists as well as well as clinical psychologists and 
licensed clinical social workers) does apply in criminal cases. 
237
 CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (2008). 
238
 Id. § 980. 
239
 Id. § 954. 
240
 Id. § 1033. 
241
 Id. § 1014. 
242
 Id. § 1035.8. 
243
 Id. § 1040 (2008); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE 6254(k) (2008).  
244
 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (2008).  
245
 Id. § 1041.  
246
 Id. § 1037.5. 
247
 Id. § 915(a).  
248
 Id. There are four elements that must be present in order for claimant to 
suppress information under a privilege. A privilege may be asserted if (1) it 
concerns a communication, (2) the nature of the communication is confidential; (3) 
the communication occurred properly between related parties as set out in the 
Evidence Code; and (4) the communication is incident to the parties’ relationship 
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A privilege encompasses three rights: (1) the personal right to refuse 
to disclose the privileged information; (2) the right to prevent third parties 
from making disclosure; and (3) the right to prevent opposing counsel and 
the judge from commenting on the exercise of a privilege.249   These 
privileges typically apply in any proceeding in which testimony can be 
compelled.250   But privileges also apply outside formal legal proceedings. 
If a privilege permits a person to withhold information when required by a 
lawful subpoena or court order, then it follows that the same party can 
withhold information upon any request (formal or informal) made outside 
the scope of legal proceedings. 
 
The privilege to withhold information, nevertheless, may be waived.  
If a privileged party chooses to disclose the information, then the privilege 
is nullified.  Moreover, some disclosures by a party may waive the privilege 
even if the party did not intend to waive, or even realize she was waiving. 
 
If an agency seeks information from a privileged party, it may seek a 
deliberate and express waiver; although, by definition, it normally has no 
power to compel waiver.   Sometimes an agency may end up accessing 
privileged information because the privileged party has unintentionally 
waived. Generally, one cannot selectively waive a privilege.  If a privileged 
party discloses the information to some third party not covered by the 
privilege (i.e., a client discloses an attorney-client communication to 
someone not his lawyer and not directly associated with the lawyer), then 
the privilege disappears, and another third party can likely compel 
disclosure when seeking it in a formal proceeding.  And, finally, a 
privileged person who discloses information to a third party outside the 
criminal justice system has probably waived the right to resist a formal 
request from a criminal justice agency that otherwise has a legal basis for 
                                                                                                                            
(i.e., person is seeking psychotherapy or legal advice). In general, communication 
consists of ‘both oral and written statements intended to convey meaning to the 
hearer and reader.’ A communication is confidential if the holder of the privilege 
intends for the information to remain private or secret and if the communication is 
not made in the presence of a third party who is not present to further the interest 
of the client. 
249
 1-10 CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS B (2008). 
250
 California Evidence Code Section 901 defines proceedings as “any action, 
hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a court, 
administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, legislative body, or any other 
person authorized by law) in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled 
to be given. CAL. EVID. CODE § 901 (2008).  
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the request. 
 
 Thus, most privileges will operate to deny government agencies 
access to covered information (absent waiver). The communication 
privileges enumerated above will rarely operate to give the public agency 
itself a privilege to withhold information it controls.  The attorney client-
privilege, however, does also belong to government officials.  An agency or 
official who is a “client” of a government lawyer has the traditional 
privilege with respect to confidential client-lawyer communications, as well 
as the closely allied privilege for attorney “work product.” This latter 
privilege is really a subset of the broader privilege category that applies to 
government-held information, the so-called official business privilege, to 
which we now turn. 
 
2. Official Information Privilege as a Barrier to Information Sharing 
Among Criminal Justice Agencies 
 
The official information privilege is the only way a public entity 
may refuse to disclose information that it or the legislature has deemed 
confidential (e.g., California Public Records Act). Official information is 
defined as “information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the 
course of his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public 
prior to the time the claim of privilege is made.”251 A public entity can elect 
not to disclose or share official information and prevent a third party from 
disclosing official information if one of the following conditions is met: 
“(1) disclosure of the information is forbidden by a federal or a California 
statute or (2) disclosure is against the public interest (i.e., a court must 
weigh the need for confidentiality against the need for disclosure in the 
interest of justice).”252   
  
Penal Code Sections 1040(b)(1)-(2) essentially creates two types of 
official information privileges. There is an absolute privilege against 
disclosure of official information (Penal Code Section 1040(b)(1)) and there 
is a conditional privilege against disclosure of official information (Penal 
Code Section 1040(b)(2)) that covers all information that is not privileged 
under Penal Code Section 1040(b)(1). If the privilege is claimed by an 
eligible public employee on behalf of the public entity and the disclosure is 
prohibited by an act of Congress or by a California statute, the public entity 
has an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose the official information. If the 
                                                 
251
 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(A) (2008).  
252
 Id. § 1040(B)(1)-(2).  
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privilege is claimed by an eligible public employee on behalf of the public 
entity and the court determines the disclosure is against the public interest, 
the public entity has a conditional privilege to refuse to disclose the official 
information.253 
  
There are two qualifications to Penal Code Sections 1040(b)(1)-
(2).254 Similar to qualifications and waiver rules for other types of 
privileges, “official information is neither conditionally nor absolutely 
privileged if it was not acquired in confidence or if it was officially 
disclosed to the public prior to the time the claim of privilege was made.’255 
In addition, a public entity may not claim a conditional privilege if an 
employee, who is authorized to claim the privilege, already consented to 
disclosure.  
 
This privilege interacts in important ways with Chapter 2 (Criminal 
Offender Record Information) of Title 3 of Part 4 of the California Penal 
Code, which creates a strong foundation for integrated criminal justice 
information systems and, more generally, formalized information sharing 
among actors in the criminal justice system.256 Penal Code Section 13100, 
in part, recognizes the need for improved access to and sharing of 
information across criminal justice agencies.257 In particular, Penal Code 
Section 13100(a) explains that “the criminal justice agencies in this state 
require, for the performance of their official duties, accurate and reasonably 
complete offender record information.”258 Penal Code 13100(e) states that 
“the recording, reporting, storage, analysis, and dissemination of criminal 
offender information in this state must be made more uniform and efficient, 
and better controlled and coordinated.”259 
 
 Penal Code Section 13300(1) authorizes local criminal justice 
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 Id.  
254
 2 WITKIN CAL. EVID. WITNESSES § 247 (2008).  
255
 CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE—ANNOTATED § 191.81 
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agencies to compile and share selected “local summary criminal history 
information” pertaining to “the identification and criminal history of any 
person, such as name, date of birth, physical description, dates of arrest, 
arresting agencies and booking numbers, charges, dispositions, and similar 
data about a former criminal offender.”260 A local criminal justice agency is 
permitted to share local summary criminal history information with selected 
parties, including public defenders and attorneys of record, district 
attorneys, courts, probation officers, and the former criminal offender.261  
 
But while Penal Code Section 13300 et seq. provides a basic 
statutory foundation for information sharing among criminal justice 
agencies, there are statutory limits on the information that the criminal 
justice agencies are permitted to share, and which can trigger the absolute 
privilege discussed above. Namely, local criminal justice agencies may only 
share summary information and may not share information derived from 
independent investigations or intelligence information.262 Penal Code 
Section 13102, moreover, provides that criminal record information 
compiled by criminal justice agencies must not include information such as 
intelligence, analytical, and investigative reports or files.263 
 
 In effect, the statutory provisions that address permitted information 
sharing among local criminal justice agencies suggest that the official 
information privilege poses the most significant barrier to more effective 
information sharing. Assuming that most criminal justice agencies have 
sufficient access to summary criminal history, as limited by statute and 
court decisions, and that summary criminal information is accurately 
maintained, criminal justice agencies still do not have formal access to 
“contemporaneous” information about offenders.  Given that the official 
information privilege generally prevents the disclosure of investigative files, 
most criminal justice agencies would benefit from formalized access to this 
information possessed by other law enforcement agencies.264  
 
3. The Potential Impact of Official Information Privileges on Information 
Sharing 
 
Criminal justice agencies are likely to invoke their official 
information privileges when they relate to "contemporary" information, 
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information related to an ongoing investigation or pending adjudicatory 
proceeding.  Those agencies may prefer to self-report and share summary 
information under Penal Code section 13300(1), thereby avoiding the 
exposure of sensitive investigative information – a concern raised by Penal 
Code section 13102 – if a defendant or third party seeks broader discovery.  
 
In some ways, it is best to think of the official information privilege 
as a type of work-product privilege (at least in the summary versus 
contemporary information comparison), with Section 13300 allowing for 
information that is fundamentally factual to be shared. By no means perfect, 
the analogy speaks to the idea that criminal justice agencies have an interest 
in keeping their investigative processes and confidential sources private, as 
the privilege protects information (i.e., underlying methods and notes of 
investigators) that is not included in a summary report. 
 
The official information privilege, therefore, poses a “barrier” to 
criminal justice information systems, as it undoubtedly prevents some 
information from being included in an integrated database. That impact, 
however, is true of all privileges. Thus, if the goal of a criminal justice 
system is simply to formalize communication among criminal justice actors, 
then privileges pose no real “barrier” to the effectiveness of that mission. In 
this regard, formal information-sharing networks would complement the 
informal networks that already exist and, at the least, give criminal justice 
actors a centralized source of information.  
 
Consequently, the real value of a criminal justice information 
system rests not in its comprehensiveness, but rather in its ability to 
facilitate communication and interagency coordination. As long as actors 
are aware (and they likely are), that the information documented in an 
information system is not entirely representative of the information that 
participating criminal justice actors either have or have access to (based on 
their relationship to the privilege holder), then the privileges do not interfere 
with effective data sharing. 
 
In sum, privileges don't “matter” to information sharing systems in 
the sense that privileges are not new and have always posed a barrier. These 
systems remain important, moreover, because they can change the regular 
means of communication and coordination between agencies (i.e., formal, 
searchable databases versus unconnected conversations and personal 
contacts), not because they guarantee the information in their databases is 
fully comprehensive. 
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4. Waiver of Privileges: Consent to Disclose as a Mechanism to Facilitate 
Information Sharing Between Criminal Justice Agencies 
 
 The holder of the privilege has the right to prevent another person 
from disclosing privileged information. Assuming that the privilege holder 
has not waived the privilege implicitly, and that an applicable exception to a 
privilege does not apply, criminal justice agencies must get permission (as 
third party representatives) to integrate and share that privileged 
information.265  
  
Evidence Code Section 912(a) provides that the holder of a privilege 
waives a claim to a privileges if he or she has voluntarily “disclosed a 
significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made 
by anyone.”266  Section 912(a) further explains that “consent to disclosure is 
manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege 
indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege 
in any proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and 
opportunity to claim the privilege.”267 Some disclosures do not amount to a 
waiver of the privilege if the disclosure itself is privileged (i.e., privileges 
may be layered).268   
 
 What if the criminal justice agency possesses the privilege (i.e., 
official information)? In this situation, a criminal justice agency may be 
reluctant to waive its privilege and participate in an information sharing 
network, particularly if an unaligned party (e.g., public defenders and 
general members of the public) would gain unfettered access to information.  
This is particularly important given the theory that privileges cannot be 
selectively waived.269 As a procedural matter, a third party criminal justice 
agency that waives the privilege would no longer be considered a third 
party once it participates in an integrated information system. The 
information possessed by the agency would no longer be subject to a 
subpoena duces tecum. Instead, the opposing counsel would simply have to 
demonstrate that the holder or representative of the holder of the privilege 
waived the privilege.270  
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 In effect, the information would remain sensitive, but it would 
technically not be confidential. A party that engages in interagency 
information sharing could still protect its interest in confidentiality by filing 
a motion to limit or deny the requested discovery. But the party attempting 
to limit the disclosure of information would have a less compelling 
argument for confidentiality since it already waived associated privileges. 
Therefore, even if the party gets an in-camera review of the evidence in 
question, it may ultimately be forced to the disclose information.   
 
  Another potential impediment and concern regarding waiver of 
privileges by certain criminal justice agencies is that the privilege may not 
be waivable. For example, government entities subject to the disclosure 
requirements and exemptions of the California Public Record Act, 
discussed above, may not disclose information that is prohibited by law.271 
There may be an overriding state public interest in non-disclosure of certain 
privileged information that prohibits local agencies from disclosing and 
sharing public records that are exempt from disclosure.272 
 
VII.  LIABILITY 
 
Law enforcement officials have expressed concern that disclosing 
information, or relying on inaccurate information, might expose them to 
personal liability.  This section deals with departmental and individual 
liability that might result from misuse of information or inaccurate 
information.  The bottom line is that fears of liability are overstated.  
Provided that agencies follow safeguards—safeguards they are already 
required to follow under CLETS guidelines—they should not be exposed to 
any liability.  If there are rogue employees who deliberately violate policies 
or otherwise misuse information, the liability will attach to them personally.  
But if agencies use data in a reasonable fashion, in the ordinary course of 
business, it is unlikely that they can be sued for damages. 
 
Before turning to specific cases, it is useful to discuss the field of tort 
law and §1983 law more generally.  Tort law concerns the civil wrongdoing 
of one party as against another; this is generally what people mean when 
they talk about suing someone for something.  Torts can be intentional or 
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unintentional, and they can result in injunctive relief (being forced to do or 
not to do something) or damages (usually money).  Parties can be agencies 
and organizations, and they can also be individuals.  §1983 liability comes 
from a federal statute prohibiting officials from violating individuals’ 
constitutional rights.   
 
For tort, one primary question is who can be sued.  In the work 
environment, the key question is when an employer is liable for the actions 
of its employee—for example, when a police department is responsible for 
the actions of an individual officer.  This type of liability is known as 
respondeat superior liability.  Generally, an employer is only responsible 
for the actions of its employee when that employee is acting within the 
scope of employment.  If an employee is not on the clock, or not doing the 
ordinary business for which he or she was hired, and/or not abiding by 
company policy, then the employer is not responsible.  So a police officer 
on the beat would be in the scope of employment, but an out-of-uniform 
police officer on vacation would not be.  Many tort claims against agencies 
could be resolved by this doctrine, provided the individuals were not acting 
within their scope of employment.   
 
The second thing to consider is who pays damages.  Individuals are 
often, as a matter of their employment contracts, indemnified against suits.  
This means that, generally, individuals need not pay to defend themselves 
against suits arising from their employment, nor do they need to pay 
damages should they lose.  Indemnification is a near universal feature of 
law enforcement contracts and covers both ordinary torts and §1983 claims. 
 
Section A of this part concerns the tort claims of defamation and 
invasion of privacy, concluding that the risks of being successfully sued 
under either theory is remote.  Section B looks at individual suits under § 
1983.  Section C looks at the remote possibility that an individual might 
grossly misuse information—say, selling access to a database—concluding 
that in such cases it is unlikely that an agency will be held responsible for 
such actions.  Finally, Section D considers whether there might be 
proprietary intellectual property claims made against those who use data. 
 
A.  Tort Claims for Defamation and Invasion of Privacy 
 
The bulk of this Primer addresses a number of very specific and 
highly technical rules governing disclosure of criminal justice information, 
most of them arising under state and federal statutes regulating public 
agencies.  An equally important arena, however, are the two traditional legal 
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doctrines of defamation and invasion of privacy.  Perhaps the most common 
worry for public officials handling personal information is the possibility of 
a lawsuit under one of these grounds.  A summary of the basic doctrines in 
these areas, however, should provide reassurance that this concern is greatly 
exaggerated. The criteria for defamation and invasion of privacy claims—
and the special immunities accorded public officials under these doctrines—
make it very unlikely that such lawsuits will be filed, and even less likely 
that they will succeed. 
 
1. Defamation 
 
Defamation is the utterance of a false statement about an individual 
that damages that person’s reputation in some material way.  A statement 
can only be defamatory if it is about a factually verifiable matter, not if it is 
an expression of subjective opinion, however negative that opinion is.  The 
false factual statement must cast the individual in a bad light as understood 
by established and customary moral and social standards.  Defamation is 
called libel if it is written or published in some printed form; it is called 
slander if it is expressed orally. 
 
A criminal justice agency can generally protect itself from 
defamation claims by implementing careful policies that inhibit the 
unintentional republication of data outside the agency. Moreover, if an 
alleged defamer is a government official and the statement that would 
otherwise qualify as defamatory is made in the course of designated duties, 
the official enjoys special exemptions from personal liability. 
 
In California, a statement made or released by a public official “in 
the proper discharge of an official duty” is absolutely privileged and thus 
cannot support a defamation claim, even if the statement is erroneous.273  
For instance, in Kilgore v. Younger, a prosecutor erroneously included the 
plaintiff’s name in a press release naming persons suspected of organized 
crime activity.  The Supreme Court of California held that the press release, 
though improper, was within the scope of the prosecutor’s legitimate duties 
and thus was privileged.274 
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A plaintiff alleging defamation against a criminal justice official can 
overcome this privilege by meeting one of two tests.  The first test requires 
the plaintiff to show that the challenged action was not part of the official’s 
designated functions. This test establishes a high hurdle, as courts construe 
the term “appropriate exercise of the [official’s] discretion” broadly.275  The 
second test requires the plaintiff to show that the defamatory statement was 
made with “actual malice.”  This would require the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the official uttered the statement with “hatred or ill will toward the 
plaintiff” or that the official, lacking any reasonable grounds for belief in 
the truth of the statement, uttered it in “reckless disregard” of its 
falsehood.276  In the area of criminal justice information, the worst that a 
plaintiff could normally allege is that an official was careless in 
disseminating a falsehood; thus, in the absence of hatred or ill will, the 
actual malice test is almost impossible to meet in the criminal justice 
context. 
 
Furthermore, in the very unlikely event of a viable defamation suit 
against a public official, the First Amendment limits the amount of damages 
the official can be required to pay.277  In earlier eras, juries were allowed to 
presume that harm had occurred and make awards without specific proof of 
damages. But under contemporary First Amendment law, in cases where (1) 
the challenged utterance related to a matter of public concern and (2) the 
alleged defamer did not know the statement was false, monetary recovery is 
limited to “actual” damages—provable harm to reputation and emotional 
harm.278  Because criminal justice matters are often of public concern, the 
actual damages rule significantly limits the exposure of government 
agencies to tort actions. 
 
Other state law privileges overlap with and supplement this official 
immunity to provide criminal justice officials even stronger protection 
against defamation suits.  First, allegedly defamatory statements uttered 
during the course of formal litigation are absolutely privileged.279  Second, 
police and correctional officers are immunized against common law tort 
suits by arrested or imprisoned individuals except in narrow exceptions 
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(like vehicular torts and physical assault) that do not include defamation.280 
 
Furthermore, federal government officials are protected against 
defamation-related causes of action by the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), a federal statute that immunizes all federal employees acting 
within the scope of their employment from tort liability including 
defamation.281 
 
Finally, the most powerful statutory remedy available to individuals 
suing state officials for unconstitutional actions is of no avail in defamation 
suits. That statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allows individuals to sue state or local 
officials who have violated their federal (usually constitutional) rights. 
Thus, an individual who claims to be the victim of an unconstitutional 
search and seizure or a prisoner who alleges abusive conditions in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment can sue under § 1983 (although even then, 
individual officials enjoy a “qualified immunity” if their actions were based 
on a reasonable, but erroneous, belief that they were lawful282).  However, 
there is no federal constitutional right not to be defamed; protection of 
reputation is a right developed by common law tradition and enjoys no 
constitutional status.283 Consequently, § 1983 is not an available remedy for 
defamation claims. 
 
2. Invasion of Privacy 
 
In contrast to defamation, invasion of privacy involves statements that 
are concededly true.  Moreover, a plaintiff claiming invasion of privacy 
need not allege that the statements complained of harmed his or her 
reputation.  In invasion of privacy actions, the alleged harm is that public 
disclosure of information violated the plaintiff’s right to keep certain 
intimate personal facts confidential. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right of 
privacy with respect to some aspects of a person’s private life—namely 
intimate matters about marriage, family, or sexuality—that are protected 
from excessive government regulation.  But the federal Constitution does 
not recognize a broader general right to keep private matters from public 
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disclosure. Rather, the source of this right is in state law. 
 
The California Constitution explicitly provides a right to privacy,284 
the violation of which can be the basis for a civil lawsuit.  An individual has 
a cause of action for violation of this right if she can establish a legally 
protected privacy interest, a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
circumstances, and conduct that constitutes a serious invasion of privacy.285  
In determining whether the right has been breached, courts and juries look 
to factors including the likelihood of serious harm, particularly to the 
emotional sensibilities of the victim, the alleged intruder’s motives and 
objectives, and the absence of countervailing interests from competing 
social norms, rendering an individual’s conduct offensive. Countervailing 
interests include a legitimate public interest in (1) exposing otherwise 
private information or behavior and (2) prosecuting serious crimes.286  This 
last factor is a significant limitation on invasion of privacy lawsuits against 
criminal justice actors, since otherwise non-privileged facts contained in 
criminal justice records are likely to satisfy this criterion. 
 
On the other hand, if a criminal justice official asserts a sufficient 
countervailing interest, the plaintiff gets a chance to rebut that 
countervailing interest by showing there are feasible and effective 
alternatives to the defendant’s conduct that have a less severe impact on the 
plaintiff’s privacy interest. But even this is a high hurdle for the plaintiff: 
 
For example, if intrusion is limited and confidential 
information is carefully shielded from disclosure 
except to those who have a legitimate need to know, 
privacy concerns are assuaged.  On the other hand, if 
sensitive information is gathered and feasible 
safeguards are slipshod or nonexistent, or if 
defendant’s legitimate objectives can be readily 
accomplished by alternative means having little or no 
impact on privacy interests, the prospects of 
actionable invasion of privacy is enhanced.287 
 
Thus, a criminal justice official who can demonstrate that a privacy 
intrusion was limited and that confidential information has been shielded 
from disclosure other than to those who have a legitimate need to know 
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should have little trouble defending him or herself against an invasion of 
privacy claim, even if alternatives to the invasion existed.  
 
Finally, other common law doctrines make an invasion of privacy 
suit even less of a concern for public officials. First, if the information is 
contained in a form that already constitutes a public record (such as facts 
contained in most non-juvenile court records), then disseminating the 
information more widely cannot, by definition, violate the right to 
privacy.288  Statements made during the course of litigation are, as with 
defamation suits, absolutely privileged and thus cannot serve as the basis 
for a tort suit.289  Moreover, the privilege for discharge of official duties, 
discussed earlier, also applies in privacy suits, and—as with defamation—
overcoming immunity in privacy cases requires the plaintiff to allege that 
the disclosure did not fall within the broad description of an official’s duties 
or that the disclosure was motivated by “actual malice.” 
 
The bottom line for invasion of privacy claims—like that 
defamation claims—is that common law doctrines leave ample room for 
effective and efficient information sharing among criminal justice officials, 
so long as the sharing has a legitimate criminal justice purpose. 
 
B.  Individual Liability Under § 1983 
 
Police employees who rely on inaccurate data should not be 
concerned about civil lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute 
permitting individuals to sue for violations of federally protected rights. In 
most cases, qualified immunity will protect the police officers against a 
§ 1983 claim, and where the error is a result of mere negligence, no Due 
Process violation will arise. Senior law enforcement officials are not likely 
to face liability: respondeat superior, the doctrine allowing employers to be 
held responsible for their employees’ actions, does not apply to suits 
brought under § 1983.  Liability may occur only where they exhibit bad 
faith in the form of “deliberate indifference”—i.e., where they knew it was 
certain or highly likely that they were relying on inaccurate data.  
 
First, qualified immunity shields “government officials . . . from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
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would have known.”290 In other words, even if a government official 
violates an individual’s rights, qualified immunity will shield her from 
liability if she could not reasonably have known she was violating those 
rights. Qualified immunity aims to protect government officials who 
reasonably believe that the alleged unlawful act was lawful in light of 
clearly established law and the factual information possessed at the time.291  
For example, when a police officer relies on a search or arrest warrant 
premised on data which, unbeknownst to him, is inaccurate (as in Herring 
and Evans), he will likely be granted immunity because a reasonable officer 
in his position “would not have known there was no constitutional basis 
for” the arrest or search.292 Even if a police employee makes an initial 
mistake in an arrest warrant database that leads to an unlawful search (as in 
Herring), that employee will not be subject to § 1983 sanctions, so long as 
her mistake did not intentionally lead to the arrest.293 That is, no liability 
will result if, in making the negligent errors, the police officer did not intend 
to violate the individual’s constitutional rights.  
 
Second, a suspect who suffers a Fourth Amendment violation (i.e., a 
search or seizure violation) as a result of a police officer’s reliance on 
inaccurate data will not succeed in bringing a cause of action where the 
violation was the result of mere negligence.294 If, however, a system 
contains widespread errors, the violation may rise to the level of “deliberate 
indifference” to the suspect’s constitutional rights, which could enable the 
suspect to prevail against an individual police officer on a Due Process 
claim.295 Thus, police departments should establish reliable warrant systems 
to avoid potential liability stemming from a finding of “deliberate 
indifference.”  
 
Third, senior law enforcement officials cannot be held liable for 
their subordinates’ constitutional violations because respondeat superior 
does not apply to § 1983 actions.296 If, however, the suspect can show that 
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an official policy or practice, or a failure to train that amounts to deliberate 
indifference caused the violation, the county may be held liable.297 Note, 
however, that courts typically view police departments enforcing criminal 
law as arms of the state, thereby shielding the county from liability under 
the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.298 Still, the potential civil 
liability and evidentiary consequences of reckless data keeping should 
caution police departments to establish and maintain reliable databases.  
 
Finally, a suspect who suffers a constitutional violation will almost 
certainly fail in efforts to gain injunctive relief under § 1983. The suspect 
can gain injunctive relief only if he can “establish a real and immediate 
threat” that he will suffer the same constitutional violation again.299 In 
Herring, for example, the petitioner would need to show that “he would 
again be the subject of an arrest warrant that was later revoked but not 
removed from a computer database, and that this outdated information 
would again become the basis for his subsequent unconstitutional arrest.”300 
This would be a nearly impossible showing to make.  
 
 The lack of a process for reporting inaccurate personal data may, in 
certain circumstances, however, leave open the possibility of a lawsuit. In 
particular, false public records may give rise to tort suits for constitutional 
violations (e.g., under § 1983) when the claim involves more than mere 
defamation or violation of privacy, and implicates another constitutional 
right. Most notably, a federal appeals court allowed two parents to proceed 
with a suit against Los Angeles County after they were placed on 
California’s Child Abuse Central Index.301 The database was made widely 
available, and no procedure existed to petition to have erroneously included 
names removed from the list.302 The court found that the lack of any 
recourse for erroneous records violated the Due Process guarantees of the 
14th Amendment.303 The court dismissed the case against the individual 
officers named in the suit because they had acted in official capacities, but 
the court found that the county could be held liable and remanded the case 
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for further trial.304 By contrast, a federal appeals court dismissed all § 1983 
claims by a woman placed on the federal no-fly list, but it did allow some 
claims to receive further hearing, including a challenge under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which allows individuals to file a lawsuit to 
enjoin illegal actions by a federal agency.305 
 
To avoid the possibility of legal liability under § 1983, agencies 
should consider implementing procedures for individuals to check their 
records and petition for the correction of inaccurate data. Though the 
unreviewable inclusion of inaccurate data may not rise to the level of 
violating an individual’s constitutional rights, inadequate procedures for 
redress can help a plaintiff move from a mere right-to-privacy claim (which 
will usually be dismissed because of governmental privileges) to a § 1983 
claim. 
 
C.  Misuse of Information 
 
Deliberate and gross misuse of information leads to individual 
liability alone.  Gross misuse will not tend to make agencies and employers 
liable, simply because such actions are not reasonably foreseeable.  When 
harms cannot be foreseen, there is nothing an employer could have done to 
prevent the harm from occurring, and thus nothing it needs to do to make 
the harmed party whole. 
  
Consider this example.  In 2001, a former Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) agent was arrested after being caught selling 
criminal justice data from CLETS and other national databases to private 
investigators.306   The DEA agent, Emilio Calatayud, was charged with 
several criminal offenses: illegally accessing law-enforcement computer 
systems, wire fraud, and bribery.307  There was, however, no civil liability 
in this case.  In order to make a claim that the DEA was responsible, a 
plaintiff would have to show that Calatayud acted according to official 
policy (which he clearly didn’t), or that his supervisors knew (or should 
                                                 
304
 Id. at 1203. 
305
 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2009). 
306
 DEA Data Theft Raises Privacy Concerns, CNET NEWS, Jan. 24, 2001, 
http://news.cnet.com/DEA-data-theft-raises-privacy-concerns/2009-1023_3-
251426.html. 
307
 Id.; see also Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Former 
DEA Agent Pleads Guilty to Bribery, Tax Charges (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/usaopress/2002/txdv02DOJ456.html. 
78 DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER [12 Dec. 2010] 
have known) that he was engaged in this behavior and they deliberately did 
nothing to stop it.  Absent that showing, the liability (both criminal and 
civil) stops with him. 
 
Taking a darker hypothetical, albeit one that this author has heard 
several times from concerned law enforcement officials, suppose a rogue 
officer took someone’s address from a proprietary database and then went 
and shot them.  Would the agency be liable?  In a word, no.  Clearly this 
behavior would be outside the scope of employment.  Clearly it would not 
have been official policy.  Clearly the behavior was illegal and would be 
dealt with in the criminal justice system.  It is, of course, true that anyone 
can file a suit against anyone, but absent a showing that the employer knew 
or should have known that this was happening (or going to happen), and 
that the employer then did nothing to stop it, there is simply no way that the 
claim would survive immediate dismissal.  Tort liability does not extend to 
everyone any time something goes wrong.  It only extends to foreseeable 
harms that cause damages, where someone who had a duty to prevent the 
harm breached that duty.  There is no duty to guard against one-in-a-million 
harms that couldn’t possibly be foreseen. 
 
D.  Criminal Justice Databases and Intellectual Property 
 
 Government agencies sometimes refer to holding a “copyright” or 
“ownership” in criminal justice data.308  This language evokes concepts of 
intellectual property rights, but such rights do not appropriately apply to 
criminal justice data.  When agencies claim “ownership” and “copyright” in 
data, therefore, they are most likely invoking the security and privacy 
concerns discussed above, not intellectual property concerns.  Agencies 
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should not resort to intellectual property terminology as shorthand for 
security concerns; doing so confuses security issues with misplaced fears 
about violating intellectual property rights.  Officials should be skeptical of 
other agencies’ arguments for nondisclosure if those arguments are couched 
in the language of property ownership. 
 
 Intellectual property law allows for the copyright protection of 
original works that are independently created by an author with some 
element of creativity.309  The focus of copyright law is on the form of 
original expression, not on empirical facts or abstract ideas that are the 
content or subject of the thing expressed.  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Services Co., the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether data compilations, such as a database, could be protected by 
copyright.310  The court affirmed the principle that facts cannot be 
copyrighted, because they “do not owe their origin to an act of 
authorship,”311 but suggested that, “[f]actual compilations . . . may possess 
the requisite originality.”312  Thus, although criminal justice facts, such as 
an arrest record or court disposition, are not themselves copyrightable, 
criminal justice databases that compile factual data may be copyrightable if 
the compiler selects facts independently and with a “minimal degree of 
creativity.”313 
 
 Even if some databases are copyrightable in theory, Congress can 
choose to deny them copyright protection under statutory law.  Congress 
has, for example, explicitly denied copyright protection to works by the 
federal government.314  With state databases, the legal situation is more 
complicated.  Congress has not categorically denied copyright protection to 
works of state governments. Thus, if compilations of data by state 
governments meet Feist’s minimal creativity requirement, they can 
presumptively enjoy copyright protection.  Thus, state law must be 
consulted to determine where federal copyright law applies. 
 
In the recent case of County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court of 
Santa Clara County, the County asserted a copyright of its geographic 
information system (GIS) basemap, refusing to grant a public records 
                                                 
309
 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2009).  
310
 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
311
 Id. at 347. 
312
 Id. at 348. 
313
 Id. 
314
 17 U.S.C. § 105. 
80 DATA SHARING LEGAL PRIMER [12 Dec. 2010] 
request to release its mapping data without an end-user restriction.315  The 
court held that the California Public Records Act (CPRA) did not explicitly 
provide copyright protection to public records.316  Instead, it held that end-
user restrictions were “incompatible with the purpose and operation of the 
CPRA.”317  In the court’s view, allowing Santa Clara “to place extra-
statutory restrictions” on its records would “undercut” the CPRA’s goal to 
“increase freedom of information by giving members of the public access to 
information.”318 Although the county may have a copyright to its computer 
software and source code, as explicitly granted by the CPRA in § 6254.9(a), 
the court reemphasized the principle that for public records, “restrictions on 
disclosure are narrowly construed.”319 
 
It is highly unlikely that criminal justice databases would be found 
copyrightable, although no court in California has addressed this question 
directly.  And while some criminal justice data (such as criminal history 
information) is exempt from the CPRA public disclosure requirements 
because of confidentiality and privacy concerns,320 criminal justice records 
are still generally defined as public records, and their exemption from 
disclosure is unlikely to change the reasoning in Santa Clara – absent 
statutory authority for copyright, a state’s claim of copyright to criminal 
justice data would violate the disclosure policy of the CPRA.321  Even if the 
CPRA did not prohibit the state from asserting a copyright to its criminal 
justice database, the databases are unlikely to possess even the low 
threshold of requisite creativity established by Feist: criminal justice 
databases like CLETS are mandated by statute and governed by the 
regulations discussed above, so the compilation of criminal data is not made 
independently or creatively. 
 
What effect does intellectual property law have, then, on data 
sharing between criminal justice agencies?  The answer is probably none 
whatsoever, other than protections for the database source code.  Any 
assertion by an agency of an intellectual property right, or “ownership,” 
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over criminal justice data would not be enforceable. Although agencies may 
worry about who “owns” what data, the issue of ownership is not important 
because agencies cannot enforce an intellectual property right in public 
records. Instead, what is important (and what agencies are likely trying to 
express by using language of “ownership”) are issues of security and 
privacy related to data use and secondary dissemination.322 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Primer has aimed to clear up some common misunderstandings 
about the legal regime, most notably that data sharing somehow requires 
agencies to enter uncharted territory.  While there are some novel issues that 
data integration presents—and, as stated earlier, individuals should not rely 
on this as legal advice but should, instead, consult attorneys before enacting 
new policies—by and large, data integration does not lead to a significantly 
larger exposure to regulatory or statutory liability.  Criminal justice officials 
have a number of technical and data is one tool among many, but it can help 
criminal justice agencies do their jobs more accurately and more efficiently.  
State and federal laws provide few obstacles towards greater data 
integration among California’s state and local criminal justice agencies.  Of 
course, there are many organizational and technological issues to be worked 
out, but provided they are, one hopes that California criminal justice 
agencies will take advantage of the opportunities to do their jobs more 
efficiently and effectively. 
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 APPENDIX: CLETS AND OTHER INFORMATION SHARING NETWORKS 
 
“Will we have an integrated system in which everyone 
who routinely works with the criminal justice system 
(including law enforcement, social services, schools, courts, 
prosecutors, public defenders, corrections, probation and 
parole offices) has easy, cheap and quick access to accurate 
and relevant information? . . . The issues now are not 
technological. The issues are those of governance, 
accountability, responsibility and budgets. The issue is one 
of leadership.”323 
 
Criminal justice agencies have long recognized the benefits of 
integrated criminal justice information systems: more information, accessed 
quickly, for efficient and effective law enforcement. 324 In 1965 the 
California State Legislature enacted Government Code section 15152,325 
directing the state Attorney General to establish and maintain a “statewide 
telecommunications system of communication for the use of law 
enforcement agencies.”326 This system, known as the California Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), has greatly expanded 
since it became operational in April of 1970.327  In its first month CLETS 
processed 558,000 messages, which were mostly requests for information 
from paper files.328  Technological advances have made the transfer of vast 
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amounts of data possible, and today, with more than 800,000 users 
accessing 62,000 terminals statewide, CLETS receives over 2 million 
messages per day.329  No longer simply accessing paper files, CLETS now 
serves as the gateway to dozens of computerized databases with state, 
national, and international criminal information.330 
 
As described in the 2008 CLETS Strategic Plan, these databases 
include: 
 
• California Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS): The 
California DOJ maintains several unique data base applications, 
such as the Automated Criminal History System, Wanted Persons 
System, Stolen Vehicle System, Automated Boat System, 
Automated Firearms System, Automated Property System, 
Restraining Order file, Supervised Released File, the Missing and 
Unidentified Persons System, Mental Health Firearms Prohibition 
System, Armed Prohibitive Persons System, and the Megan’s Law. 
These systems provide critical information to CLETS users in the 
field.  
 
• Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV): CLETS also connects to 
DMV, which provides drivers license, vehicle registration, 
occupational licensing, parking citation and automated name index 
information.  
 
• National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems 
(NLETS): CLETS is linked by a direct line to the NLETS in 
Phoenix, Arizona. This NLETS interface provides backbone service 
into every state for criminal history information, vehicle registration 
and drivers license information, hazardous material information, 
aircraft registration and tracking information, snowmobile 
registration information, ORION ORI information, crime 
information from INTERPOL and Canada, national insurance crime 
information, and administrative message traffic.  
 
• National Crime Information Center: CLETS is linked by a direct 
line to the NCIC in Washington D.C., which provides a 
computerized index of documented criminal justice information 
concerning crimes and criminals of national interest. NCIC 
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databases include, but are not limited to: the Wanted Persons File; 
the Violent Felon File; the Foreign Fugitive File; the Missing 
Persons File; the Unidentified Person File; the U.S Secret Service 
File Interstate Identification Index; the Securities File; the ORI File; 
the Stolen Vehicle File; License Plate File; the Boat File; the Article 
File; the Gun File.  
 
• Oregon Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS): CLETS is linked 
to the Oregon LEDS for drivers license, stolen vehicle and 
vehicle/boat registration information, and wanted persons 
information. 331 
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